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1WHEN WORLDS COLLIDE:  FEDERAL CONSTRUCTION 
OF STATE INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE
Marcia L. McCormick*
I.  INTRODUCTION
In the 70s there was an . . . anti-war slogan:  “What if  they held a war and 
nobody came?”  The contemporary . . . counterpart to this would be “What if 
we staged a revolution and nobody noticed?”
—Handy Fuse, Simply Appalling1
The  Supreme Court  has  staged  a  federalism  revolution,  but  nobody 
noticed.  Well, actually, many have noticed that some kind of revolution is 
happening, but few can make much sense of it, and nearly everyone has 
missed a piece that is revolutionary in its own right.2  To many, the Court 
seems to be limiting the power of the federal government and expanding 
that  of  the  states,  as  recent  Commerce  Clause,  Tenth  Amendment,  and 
Eleventh Amendment  cases  suggest.3  But  at  the  same time that  it  has 
expanded state power in these areas, the Supreme Court has limited state 
power and expanded national power in others.4
* * Assistant Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University.  I am very grateful 
to my father, Mark McCormick, whose Supreme Court argument formed the basis for this Article, and 
to my husband, John O’Connell, who made several sacrifices that allowed me to attend the argument 
and to  write  this  Article.   For  their  probing questions,  suggestions,  assistance  with resources,  and 
comments on prior drafts  of this Article, great thanks to Helen Hershkoff,  Barry Friedman, Robert 
Schapiro, Brannon Denning, William Ross, David Smolin, and Howard Walthall.  Thanks also to Erwin 
Chemerinsky for his willingness to read prior drafts.  I would also like to thank all of the members of 
the Cumberland faculty who participated in a workshop on this paper.  And, finally, thank you to Bill 
Jones for outstanding research assistance.  Any errors, technical or substantive, are mine alone.
1 Simply  Appalling:   A  Jaundiced  Eye  on  the  News,  http://simplyappalling.blogspot.com/‌
2005/05/second-american-revolution-goes.html (May 16, 2005, 07:49 EST)  This statement appeared as 
part of a post on right-wing revolutions and nuclear weapons.  The original antiwar slogan is probably 
derived from a poem by Carl Sandberg, who wrote, “Sometime they’ll give a war and nobody will  
come.”   CARL SANDBURG,  THE PEOPLE,  YES 43 (1936).   The  sentiment  has  undergone  a  number  of 
permutations in service of various goals, and this permutation seemed appropriate to this topic.
2 See,  e.g.,  Erwin  Chemerinsky,  Understanding  the  Rehnquist  Court:   An  Admiring  Reply  to  
Professor Merrill, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 659, 659 (2003) (critiquing Professor Merrill’s “stunning article” 
analyzing the Rehnquist Court as “incomplete in a few important respects”).
3 See,  e.g.,  Vicki  C.  Jackson,  Narratives  of  Federalism:   Of  Continuities  and  Comparative  
Constitutional  Experience,  51  DUKE L.J. 223,  233–41  (2001)  [hereinafter  Jackson,  Narratives] 
(discussing recent Supreme Court case law on federalism as a constraint on national power); Vicki C. 
Jackson,  Seductions of Coherence, State Sovereign Immunity, and the Denationalization of Federal  
Law, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 691, 699 (2000) [hereinafter Jackson, Seductions] (“There is no doubt we are in 
the midst of a federalist revival.”); Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court:  A  
Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 570–71 (2003) (noting the dominance of constitutional 
federalism as a theme of the second Rehnquist Court).
4 See Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 659 (identifying a downward shift in the level of deference the 
Rehnquist Court  gave elected branches of government); Ruth Colker & James J.  Brudney,  Dissing 
Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 82–83 (2001) (arguing that the Rehnquist Court was not consistently in 
favor of States’ rights); Merrill,  supra note  3, at 571 (critiquing theories of the Rehnquist Court that 
ignored evidence of the Court’s favoring national power in certain circumstances).
1
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One of these expansions of national power has been in a reduction of 
the amount of deference the Court seems willing to grant to state court 
interpretations  of  state  law.   The  method  of  this  expansion  lies  in  the 
Court’s  imposition  of  federal  separation  of  powers  principles  on  state 
governments.   In  three  cases  in  recent  years,  the  Supreme  Court 
differentiated  between  the  branches  of  government  at  the  state  level  to 
justify a refusal to defer to the state courts.  It had never done so before. 
By relying on a seemingly neutral federal principle, without analyzing its 
applicability to the new context, the Court hid the aggrandizement of power 
to itself.
The first case, which we are all familiar with, and in fact are probably 
weary of, is Bush v. Gore.5  Here, the Supreme Court ordered an end to a 
recount  of  ballots  cast  in  the  2000  presidential  election.6  Justice 
Rehnquist’s concurring opinion argued that the Florida Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of state law should be rejected.  Because the United States 
Constitution delegates the power to design elections to the legislatures of 
the States, the Court had a duty to ensure that the state judicial branch was 
faithful to the will of the state legislative branch.7  He explained that, given 
this  federal  constitutional  duty,  reviewing  and  rejecting  the  state  court 
interpretation of state law “does not imply a disrespect for state courts but 
rather  a  respect  for  the  constitutionally  prescribed  role  of  state 
legislatures.”8
A similar concurrence was issued by Justice Scalia in the 2006 term, in 
Kansas v. Marsh.9  In that case, the Kansas Supreme Court had held that 
the  State’s  death  penalty  statute  violated  the  Eighth  and  Fourteenth 
Amendments, and the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.10  Scalia emphasized 
in his concurrence why it was important for the Supreme Court not to let 
states overenforce federal constitutional principles:
When state courts erroneously invalidate actions taken by the people of a State 
(through initiative or through normal operation of the political branches of their 
state government) on  state-law grounds, it is generally none of our business; 
and our displacing of those judgments would indeed be an intrusion upon state 
autonomy.  But when state courts erroneously invalidate such actions because 
they believe federal law requires it—and  especially when they do so because 
they believe  the Federal  Constitution requires  it—review by this  Court,  far 
from  undermining state autonomy, is  the only  possible way to  vindicate it. 
When a federal constitutional interdict against the duly expressed will of the 
people  of  a  State  is  erroneously  pronounced by a  State’s  highest  court,  no 
authority in the State—not even a referendum agreed to by all its citizens—can 
undo the error.  Thus, a general presumption against such review displays not 
respect for the States, but a complacent willingness to allow judges to strip the 
5 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
6 Id. at  105–11  (holding that  any recount  attempting  to  meet  the  statutory deadline  would be 
unconstitutional).
7 Id. at 112–13 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
8 Id. at 115.
9 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2529–39 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring).
10 Id. at 2520-21, 2529.
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people of the power to govern themselves.  When we correct a state court’s 
federal errors, we return power to the State, and to its people.11
After  Bush  v.  Gore,  a  flurry  of  scholarly  contributions  debated  the 
propriety of not deferring to the state court’s interpretation of state law, but 
none addressed the Court’s construction of state separation of powers in a 
systematic way.12
That  flurry  over  the  concurrence  may  have  been  much  ado  about 
nothing,  except  that,  in  addition  to  the  concerns  appearing  in  another 
concurrence, those same sentiments provided a foundation for a unanimous 
court, deciding a relatively mundane equal protection challenge to a state 
tax, to reject an interpretation of state law by a state supreme court.13  The 
Court  stated  that  “the  Constitution  grants  legislators,  not  courts,  broad 
authority (within the bounds of rationality) to decide whom they wish to 
help with their . . . laws and how much help those laws ought to provide.”14 
In other  words,  rather  than defer  to  the  state  court,  the  Supreme Court 
deferred to the state legislature.  To date, this case,  Fitzgerald v. Racing 
Association, has not  even been a blip on the radar screen of federalism 
scholars.
Fitzgerald is  representative  of  the  cases  federal  courts  routinely 
encounter where they are asked to consider an issue of state law.  That a 
state court had already analyzed the law at issue does not make this case 
11 Id. at 2530-31 (Scalia, J., concurring).
12 Two scholars have raised the issue prior to this article. Louise Weinberg discussed the issue in 
these terms, but devoted only a small portion of her article to the issue.  Louise Weinberg, When Courts 
Decide Elections:  The Constitutionality of Bush v. Gore, 82 B.U. L. REV. 609, 625–27 (2002).  Instead, 
Professor Weinberg focused primarily on the fact that the Court decided the outcome of the election, 
arguing that action was an unconstitutional aggrandizement of power.  See id. at 620 (“[T]he Court’s 
action  was  obviously  incompatible . . . with  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.”).   Additionally, 
Mark Tushnet wrote that Vicki Jackson suggested this separation-of-powers issue in an e-mail to him in 
2001.  Mark Tushnet, Renormalizing Bush v. Gore:  An Anticipatory Intellectual History, 90 GEO. L.J. 
113, 124 n.64 (2001).
13 Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 108 (2003).  At issue were the taxes on 
the proceeds of slot machines at the State’s racetracks and riverboats; these proceeds were the primary 
source of revenue for both types of gaming establishments.  Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 
648 N.W.2d 555, 557, 559 (Iowa 2002),  rev’d, 539 U.S. 103 (2003).  At the State’s horse and dog 
racetracks, slot machine proceeds were taxed at a maximum of 36%, while at the State’s riverboats, 
they were taxed at a maximum of 20%.  IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 99F.4A(6), .11 (West 2004).  Finding that 
the proceeds were similarly situated, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the higher taxation on racetrack 
proceeds was irrational because it frustrated the purpose of the act creating it.  Fitzgerald, 648 N.W.2d 
at 561.  The legislative purpose found by the Iowa Supreme Court was to provide another source of 
revenue to the State’s racing industry in an effort to make an unprofitable venture profitable again.  Id. 
at 560.  Taxing the proceeds at the racetracks at a much higher rate than that of the riverboats threatened 
that profitability, defeating the purpose of the act.  Id. at 560–62.  Before the Iowa Supreme Court, the 
State argued that the purpose of the act was to encourage economic growth and promote agriculture. 
Id. at  560.   The court  found that  even if  this  were  the purpose  of the act,  this  purpose,  too,  was 
frustrated by the higher tax rate on racetracks.  Id. at 561.
On appeal, the racetracks argued that, when the Iowa Supreme Court determined what the purpose 
of the act was, the court was interpreting Iowa law and its interpretation deserved the deference that is 
almost always accorded state supreme court declarations of state law.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 
26,  Fitzgerald, 539 U.S. 103 (No. 02-695).  In other words, the interpretation of the Iowa Supreme 
Court was binding on the United States Supreme Court.  See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 
Wall.)  590, 632–33 (1874) (holding that state courts are the final  interpreters of state law, and the 
Supreme Court is limited to reviewing only questions of federal law).
14 Fitzgerald, 539 U.S. at 108.
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much  more  unusual.   In  every  one  of  those  cases,  federal  courts  must 
decide whether to defer to the state-court analysis and, if so, by how much. 
Federal courts will often defer, but many times they have not done so, and 
they rarely explain the reasons for the departures they make.  This Article 
explores the reasoning behind the courts’  decisions about  deference and 
endeavors to provide some guidance for when federal courts should defer 
to state-court pronouncements of state law.
More specifically, Part II of this Article illustrates the lines of authority 
on deference for different types of state statutory questions.  Part III then 
suggests the principles that underlie this distinction, and Part IV proposes 
guidelines for federal courts to use in analyzing these problems.
I submit that when federal courts defer to a particular branch of state 
government  at  the  expense  of  another  branch,  they  infringe  on  State 
sovereignty.  The power of federal courts to review acts of Congress is a 
constitutional power.  Similarly, the power of state courts to review acts of 
state  legislatures  is  a  matter  of  state  constitutional  power.   Where  the 
Federal Constitution explicitly grants state legislatures particular powers, or 
where the state court’s actions seem designed to evade judicial review or 
frustrate a federal right, federal courts are on relatively solid ground in not 
deferring to state courts.  Conversely, where the Federal Constitution treats 
the States as unitary entities,  and where there is no indication that state 
courts  are  working  to  undermine  an  important  federal  interest,  federal 
courts have little justification to exercise independent review of state law. 
By  not  deferring,  federal  courts  would  essentially  dictate  what  state 
constitutional law should be.  That result could nullify the power of the 
people  within  the  States  to  define  their  government  and to  define  their 
individual  rights  in  a  way  more  generous  than  that  of  the  Federal 
Constitution.
II.  FEDERAL COURT APPROACHES TO STATE LAW
The Framers of our Constitution are thought to have created our federal 
system of government to diffuse power, in order to guarantee the maximum 
amount of individual freedom.15  The courts tend to treat our system of 
federalism  as  dual,  creating  two  judicial  tracks  in  which  judges  have 
competence over distinct subjects.16  Federal courts are considered to have 
greater competence over federal law, and state courts greater competence 
over state law.17  In other words, this notion of dual sovereignty suggests a 
15 See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 4, 25 (1995) (“That the political 
structure adopted in the Constitution was designed simultaneously to preserve individual liberty and to 
avoid tyranny should come as no surprise to anyone reasonably well schooled in the theory of American 
government.”); Robert A. Schapiro, Interjurisdictional Enforcement of Rights in a Post-Erie World, 46 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1399, 1401 (2005) (“One of the key purposes of federalism is to offer enhanced 
protection for individual rights.”)(citation omitted).
16 See Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 246, 
294 (2005) (describing and critiquing the theoretical model of dual federalism and its perpetuation by 
courts).
17 See MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION:  TENSION IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 2–3 (2d 
ed. 1990) (noting that federal courts are experts on national law and state courts are final interpreters of 
the law of  their  respective  jurisdictions);  Barry Friedman,  Under  the  Law of  Federal  Jurisdiction: 
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particular  division of labor for  legal  issues.   Federal  claims and federal 
issues should be heard by federal courts, and state claims and state issues 
should be heard by state courts.
Unfortunately, the world does not divide up quite so nicely, and there is 
significant overlap between state and federal issues.  For example, state 
courts are often called upon to decide issues of federal law.18  State court 
competence over federal law is not entirely surprising because state courts 
are courts of general jurisdiction.  Bound by the Supremacy Clause, they 
not only are able to decide federal questions but also have a duty to do so.19 
Of course, that competence notwithstanding, scholars disagree on whether 
state courts can adequately protect federal interests.20
Allocating  Cases  Between  Federal  and  State  Courts,  104  COLUM.  L.  REV. 1211,  1236–41  (2004) 
(discussing how a sovereign’s own courts should decide questions involving that sovereign’s laws); 
Schapiro, supra note 15, at 1409; see also Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional  
Litigation, 22  WM.  & MARY L. REV. 605, 607 (1981) (describing the rhetorical tradition that  holds 
federal judges more competent to adjudicate federal matters);  Philip B. Kurland, Professor of Law, 
Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., Toward a Co-operative Judicial Federalism:  The Federal Court Abstention 
Doctrine, Address Before the Conference of Chief Justices (August 20, 1959),  in 24 F.R.D. 481, 487 
(1960) (“I start with the principle that the federal courts are the primary experts on national law just as 
the State courts are the final expositors of the laws of their respective jurisdictions.”).
18 This role has always been part of the fabric of the federal judicial system, and the Madisonian 
Compromise, which gave Congress the option to create lower federal courts, reflects this.  MICHAEL E. 
SOLIMINE & JAMES L. WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS:  THE INEVITABILITY OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 29–31 
(1999).   The debate at  the time centered on whether the creation of lower federal courts would be 
necessary to handle the broad caseload of federal cases or would instead infringe on the role of States in 
deciding federal issues.  Id.  And, given how few cases the United States Supreme Court hears, the 
States have become important guardians of federal interests.  See Friedman, supra note 17, at 1218–20 
(noting that caseload constraints make it impossible for the Supreme Court to review many of the state 
cases  involving  federal  questions);  Robert  R.  Pushaw,  Jr.,  Bridging  the  Enforcement  Gap  in 
Constitutional  Law:   A  Critique  of  the  Supreme  Court’s  Theory  that  Self-Restraint  Promotes  
Federalism, 46  WM.  & MARY L. REV. 1289, 1304 (2005) (“[T]he Court has often reassured us that 
federal constitutional rights will be protected because state judges would fairly consider them . . . .”); 
Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 35 IND. L. 
REV. 335, 350–53 (2002) (arguing that a decrease in the review of state court cases by the Supreme 
Court “may make it difficult for federal and state lower court judges to resolve correctly or uniformly 
issues of federal law”).
19 See,  e.g.,  Trainor v.  Hernandez,  431 U.S.  434, 443 (1977) (“‘[S]tate courts  have the solemn 
responsibility equally with federal courts’ to safeguard constitutional rights . . . .” (quoting Steffel v. 
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1974))); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1946) (holding that state 
courts may not discriminate against  federal  claims, but rather,  have a duty to hear them);  see also 
Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WIS. 
L. REV. 39, 49–52, 161–70 (analyzing state-court obligations not to discriminate against federal claims); 
cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 757 (1999) (holding that this duty is simply not to discriminate 
between state and federal claims, but that the States are not required to hear federal claims if they do not 
entertain similar state claims).
20 Compare Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1131 (1977) (“[T]he only 
judicial forums . . . capable of enforcing countermajoritarian checks in a sustained, effective manner are 
the federal courts[,] and . . . , to the extent that constitutional cases can be shifted from federal to state 
trial courts, the capacity of individuals to mount successful challenges to collective decisions will be 
substantially diminished.”) with Bator, supra note 17, at 637 (“[S]tate courts will and should continue to 
play a substantial role in the elaboration of federal constitutional  principles.”), Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Ending the Parity Debate, 71  B.U. L. REV. 593, 599 (1991) (“[T]he differences between federal and 
state courts do not necessarily translate into decisions that are more protective of individual liberties.”), 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered:  Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 
233, 236–37 (1988) (“[L]itigants with federal constitutional claims should generally be able to choose 
the forum, federal or state, in which to resolve their disputes.”), and Michael E. Solimine & James L. 
Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts:  An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 
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As accepted as the notion of state court competence over federal issues 
is,  federal  courts  seem less  competent  to  decide  state  law issues.   The 
mantra of modern federalism is  that federal courts  are courts  of  limited 
jurisdiction and may only exercise the jurisdiction that the Constitution or 
federal statutes grant.  Thus, our first instinct might be to say that federal 
courts should never decide issues of state law.21
That approach, however, is not required by the text or structure of the 
Constitution.22  The Constitution extends the judicial power of the United 
States to “all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the 
Laws  of  the  United  States,  and  Treaties[,  and] . . . to  Controversies” 
between certain parties.23  Moreover, the appellate power of the Supreme 
Court extends “both as to Law and Fact.”24  By empowering the judicial 
branch to decide all cases and particular controversies, and by defining the 
appellate  power as allowing de novo review, the  Constitution gives the 
judicial branch the power to decide every issue, whether of fact or of law, 
whether  state  or  federal,  as  long as  that  issue is  contained in a case or 
controversy that would fall within Article III’s limits.25  Thus, under the 
Constitution’s  terms,  federal  courts  likely  have  the  power  not  only  to 
10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 214–15 (1983) (“[S]tate courts are no more ‘hostile’ to the vindication of 
federal rights than are their federal counterparts, and . . . the opportunity for review by state appellate 
courts  and  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  significantly  mitigates  concern  over  the  institutional 
competence of state trial courts.”).
21 See Schapiro, supra note 15, at 1426–28 (postulating that only state courts have the authority to 
dictate state law by interpreting it).
22 Many scholars  have described the way that  the federal  and state governments  actually  work 
together as “cooperative” federalism, which is not really a normative theory, but simply a description of 
voluntary activity.  E.g., Daniel J. Elazar,  Cooperative Federalism,  in COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:  EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 65, 80–83 (Daphne A. Kenyon & 
John Kincaid eds., 1991); Roderick M. Hills, Jr.,  The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism:  
Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96  MICH. L. REV. 813, 815–16 
(1998).  John Kincaid has argued that in the late 1970s cooperative federalism was replaced by coercive 
federalism  when  the  federal  government  began  using  more  coercive  regulatory  tools,  such  as 
preempting state authority and presenting the states with unfunded mandates.   John Kincaid,  From 
Cooperative to Coercive Federalism, 509 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 139, 148–49 (1990).
23 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
24 Id.
25 This is not to say that there are no constitutional limits on the review of facts found at the trial-
court level.  The Seventh Amendment explicitly limits the facts a federal appellate court can review, 
and the Due Process Clause may also provide some limit.  See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact  
Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 233–34 (1985) (noting the Seventh Amendment’s prohibition against 
reexamining  facts  tried  by  a  jury).   Additionally,  the  doctrine  of  adequate  and  independent  state 
grounds, which provides that the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction over a case that presents a federal 
question if the judgment could be wholly supported on the outcome of a state-law issue, may have 
constitutional foundations.  The Supreme Court’s reversal of the judgment would have no effect on the 
result, since the state court could issue the same judgment on state-law grounds.  Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 
U.S. 117, 126 (1945).  The Supreme Court’s decision would be an advisory opinion.  Id.;  see also 
Cynthia L. Fountaine, Article III and the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 48 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1053 (1999) (arguing that the adequate-and-independent-state-law-grounds doctrine is a part of 
Article III’s standing requirement).  It is difficult to see, though, how what happened in Fitzgerald v. 
Racing Association, where the State did just that on remand, would not be an advisory opinion in the 
same  way.   But  see Michigan  v.  Long,  463  U.S.  1032,  1038  n.4,  1039–40  (1983)  (detailing  the 
circumstances in which the Court will take jurisdiction, even though the judgment could be sustained on 
state grounds, namely, where those grounds are not  clearly the actual  grounds relied on, not  truly 
adequate, or not truly independent).
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consider issues of state law, but also to decide them without deferring to 
state-court constructions of that law.26
Not only does the text of the Constitution allow federal courts a broad 
reach  to  decide  state-law  issues,  the  structure  of  the  Constitution  also 
demonstrates that state and federal governance overlap significantly.  The 
federal government and the States share competence to legislate in many 
areas.  While some categories are truly reserved to the States, like a general 
police power, and some are granted exclusively to the federal government, 
like the power to grant patents, these discrete categories grow ever fewer as 
our society changes and more conduct transcends State boundaries.
Because of the overlap of federal and state law, federal courts encounter 
state-law questions in a number of ways.27  The most obvious situation is 
when the federal court is sitting in diversity.28  In other situations, federal 
courts exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims that arise 
from the same nucleus of operative fact as a claim federal courts would 
have jurisdiction over.29
In addition to these situations in which the state-law issues make up 
discrete causes  of  action,  questions of  federal  law are  often intertwined 
with questions of state law.  For example, a federal court may consider a 
federal question to which federal common law applies, and the content of 
that  federal  common  law  may  be  state  law.30  Other  examples  of 
intertwined  issues  include  situations  when  the  state-law  question  is  an 
essential step in the analysis of federal law, such as when the court must 
decide whether the Federal Constitution protects a right created by state 
26 Monaghan,  supra note  25, at 272–73 (arguing that the Supreme Court can use its discretion to 
review the fact-finding and law application of state courts); Henry Paul Monaghan,  Supreme Court  
Review of State-Court Determinations of State Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919, 
1967  (2003)  (“[T]he  Court’s  historical  practice  provides  support  for  the  existence  of  an  ancillary 
authority to exercise independent judgment over state-law determinations in federal cases.”).  But see 
Friedman,  supra note  17, at 1237–46 (noting the sovereignty interests that States have in state courts 
interpreting and enforcing their laws and the lack of interest federal courts have in interpreting and 
enforcing  state  laws);  Barry Friedman,  A  Different  Dialogue:   The  Supreme Court,  Congress  and  
Federal Jurisdiction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1990) (arguing that “rigid readings of the text [of Article 
III] fail to account for changing conceptions of the role of federal courts”).
27 See Martin  v.  Hunter’s  Lessee,  14  U.S.  (1  Wheat.)  304,  337–47,  358–59  (1816)  (Story,  J.) 
(considering the federal courts’ power under Article III to review the judgments of state courts and to 
examine  issues  of  state  law);  see  also Maggio v.  Fulford,  462 U.S.  111,  117 (1963) (per  curiam) 
(requiring  that,  on  habeas  review of  state  criminal  proceedings,  federal  courts  defer  to  state-court 
findings of fact unless they “are not ‘fairly supported by the record’” (quoting Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 
646, § 2254, 62 Stat. 869, 967, repealed by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (2000)))).
28 The Constitution grants federal courts jurisdiction over “Controversies . . . between Citizens of 
different States.”  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  Congress gave that jurisdiction to the lower federal courts as 
well.  28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000).
29 28  U.S.C.  § 1367  (2000).   When  federal  jurisdiction  is  based  on  diversity,  there  is  no 
supplemental jurisdiction over parties that would destroy that diversity.  Id. § 1367(b).  However, only 
one party needs to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction, so there will 
be  supplemental  jurisdiction  over  diverse  parties  that  do  not  satisfy  the  amount-in-controversy 
requirement as long as one party does satisfy it.  Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 
546, 549 (2005).
30 E.g., Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001) (involving the time 
bar of a claim brought in the district courts of two different states); United States v. Kimbell Foods, 440 
U.S. 715, 739–40 (1979) (involving the prioritization of public and private liens on property).
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law31 or when a federal statute confers a benefit or puts a burden on a class 
of  people  defined  by  state  law.32  A  third  category  of  these  state-law-
antecedent  situations  occurs  when  federal  courts  evaluate  the 
constitutionality of state laws.
The analysis that follows will refer to state law as if it were a single, 
concrete  concept.   This  is  an  oversimplification  used  to  clarify  a  very 
murky area.   In  fact,  state  law issues  may come to  federal  courts  in  a 
number of ways.  State law may be contained in a statute never interpreted 
by any state court, or it may be contained in a statute that a state court 
interpreted at some point in an unrelated, prior proceedings.  Conversely, 
the law may have been made entirely through state common law.  Finally, 
the issue may come to the Supreme Court  by direct  review, and to  the 
lower  courts  on  certain  limited  kinds  of  collateral  review,  as  a  direct 
interpretation of the state law at issue by a state court applying that law to 
the exact factual context the federal court faces.  The source and nature of 
the state law will make a difference in how federal courts should interpret 
and apply that law.
This Article also discusses the state courts’ prior actions as if they were 
uniform,  and  that  too  is  an  oversimplification.   For  purposes  of  this 
discussion,  state-law determinations  could range from pure  questions  of 
law, like what law applies, to “mixed” questions of law and fact, or the 
application of the law to the facts.33  Both categories of decisions may be 
31 This  describes,  generally,  procedural  due  process  cases.   The  Constitution  prohibits  the 
government from depriving an individual of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.  U.S. 
CONST. amend. V (applying to the federal government);  id. amend. XIV, § 1 (applying to the States). 
The first step in a procedural due process case is, generally, to decide whether there is a property or 
liberty interest that the law protects, and usually that interest is created by state law.  Bd. of Regents v. 
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
32 A well-known example is the Internal Revenue Code, which determines taxable income on the 
basis of whether an individual is married, but does not define how a person becomes married.  See 26 
U.S.C. § 1 (2000 & Supp. III 2003); cf. id. § 7703 (providing rules that govern when in time a person is 
considered married, if that person has had a change in marital status; certain married people living apart 
will not be considered married under the statutory definition).  The Federal Defense of Marriage Act 
provides another limit on the definition of marriage, providing that, for federal purposes, marriage is 
any “legal union between one man and one woman,” but not defining what a legal union is.  1 U.S.C. 
§ 7 (2000).
A similar issue is present when state law incorporates a federal-law issue, such as when state tort 
law provides that violation of a federal regulation constitutes negligence per se, or when a state tax code 
defines taxable income as the income defined as taxable by the Internal Revenue Code.  See Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals  v.  Thompson, 478 U.S.  804,  816 & n.14 (1986) (affirming in  dicta that  the 
Supreme Court would have appellate jurisdiction over the federal question posed in the former example, 
but holding that normally the issue would not present a federal question before the lower federal courts 
as their statutory “arising under” jurisdiction has been interpreted (quoting Moore v. Chesapeake & 
Ohio Ry. Co., 291 U.S. 205, 214–15 (1934))).
33 This Article does not touch on the amount of deference to be given to lower court findings of fact. 
For a discussion of that issue, see Monaghan,  supra note  25, at 236–38.  Although some courts and 
scholars assert that the different types of questions are discrete, they are more properly viewed as being 
on a continuum.  Id. at 233.  Professors Allen and Pardo argue that there is no defensible distinction 
between these types of questions, and that questions of law are simply different types of fact questions. 
Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1769 
(2003).
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reviewed de novo, but the more fact-intensive the question, the more the 
courts may choose to grant some deference to the lower courts.34
A.  Rules Providing Deference to State-Court Determinations
The propriety of federal courts considering state law has been addressed 
in several different situations, with fairly consistent results.  In 1875, in the 
context of review of state court decisions, the Supreme Court examined 
whether to review issues of state law in state high-court cases when those 
state-law issues  were  distinct  from the federal-law issues.35  The  Court 
determined that, under the jurisdictional statutes, it could review all of the 
federal issues, but that the holdings of the state court on issues of state law 
could  not  be  reviewed.36  This  principle  lies  beneath  the  rule  that  the 
Supreme Court will not exercise jurisdiction over a case in which a federal 
issue is present, even if that issue was wrongly decided by the state court, if 
the  judgment  in  the  case  rests  on  “adequate  and  independent  state 
grounds.”37
Similar to the rules developed for Supreme Court review of state court 
decisions, federal courts encountering state issues must often defer to state-
court  declarations of  law.  By statute,  federal  courts  sitting in diversity 
must follow state constitutional, statutory, and common law.38  Thus, when 
34 Compare Illinois  v.  Wardlow,  528 U.S.  119,  123–26 (2000)  (applying de  novo  review to a 
determination of reasonable suspicion),  Lilly v.  Virginia, 527 U.S.  116, 136–37 (1999) (opinion of 
Stevens,  J.,  joined  by  Souter,  Ginsburg,  and  Breyer,  JJ.)  (stating  that  fact-intensive  issues  of 
constitutional law require de novo review),  and Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996) 
(using de novo review because law “acquire[s] content only through application”), with Lilly, 527 U.S. 
at  148  (5-4  decision)  (Rehnquist,  J.,  dissenting)  (arguing  that  the  question’s  fact-intensive  nature 
warranted deference),  Ornelas,  517 U.S. at 700 (Scalia, J.,  dissenting) (arguing for deference),  and 
Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 176 (1983) (deferring to application of law 
to the facts on whether  corporate activities constituted a unitary business).   But see Bose Corp. v. 
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) (holding that in First Amendment cases the 
Court must exercise de novo review of the law and facts).
35 Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 614–15 (1875); see also Calder v. Bull, 3 
U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 392 (1798) (holding that federal courts lack jurisdiction to decide whether state 
statutes are valid under state constitutional law).
36 Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 632–33.  This principle is so firmly established that, in Ring v. 
Arizona,  the  Supreme  Court  deferred  to  an  Arizona  Supreme  Court’s  refusal  to  follow  the  U.S. 
Supreme Court’s prior interpretation of an Arizona death penalty statute.  536 U.S. 584, 603 (2002). 
However, some scholars have argued that Congress did intend to give the Supreme Court the power to 
review holdings in state court decisions because, after the Civil War, Congress fundamentally distrusted 
the  state  courts.   Richard  A.  Matasar  &  Gregory  S.  Bruch,  Procedural  Common  Law,  Federal 
Jurisdictional Policy, and Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 1291, 1319–20 (1986).
37 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1983).
38 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71–80 (1938) (interpreting the Rules of Decision Act, 
ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000))).  The holding in 
Erie rested, in part, on perceived constitutional limitations.  See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth 
of  Erie,  87  HARV.  L.  REV. 693,  703  (1974)  (“[N]othing  in  the  Constitution  provided  the  central 
government with a general lawmaking authority of the sort the Court had been exercising . . . .”); Paul J. 
Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie:  The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682, 1683 (1974) (“That 
Congress may have constitutional power to make federal law displacing state substantive policy does 
not imply an equal range of power for federal judges.”).   Some scholars have cast doubt  on these 
principles as constitutionally required.  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,  FEDERAL JURISDICTION 326 (5th ed. 2007) 
(“The constitutional basis for the  Erie decision  has confounded scholars.” (citing Ely,  supra; Stewart 
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the State’s highest court has declared what the law is, federal courts must 
follow that determination when deciding diversity cases.
Similar  to  the  adequate-and-independent-state-grounds  threshold  for 
Supreme Court review of state court decisions, lower federal courts may 
abstain entirely from considering cases in certain circumstances when state 
law is unclear.39  For the court to abstain in constitutional cases, the state 
law  must  be  substantially  uncertain,  and  there  must  be  a  reasonable 
possibility that the state court’s clarification will resolve the issue so that 
the court need not reach the constitutional issue.40  In diversity cases, the 
state-law issue must be unclear and the case must involve some important 
state interest  that  is  part  of  the  State’s  unique power as sovereign,  like 
eminent domain.41  Similarly, in federal-question cases in which the issue is 
regulated  by  a  complex  state  administrative  process  designed  to  treat 
uniformly an essentially local problem, federal courts may defer to the state 
process rather than issue injunctive relief.42
Short of abstention, special rules of construction have been developed 
that embody deference to the states for cases in which federal courts must 
interpret  state  laws  that  have  been  challenged  as  violating  the  Federal 
Constitution.43  Statutes, even those enacted by states, are presumed to be 
constitutional, and a challenger bears the burden of demonstrating that a 
statute violates the Constitution.44  Where the challenge is that the law is 
unconstitutionally vague, it  must be vague in all  of its  applications,  not 
merely unclear in some instances.45  And where a statute might seem on its 
Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law (pt. 2), 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231 (1985); and Martin H. Redish & 
Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act:  In Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91 
HARV. L. REV. 356 (1977))).
39 See La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27–29 (1959) (abstaining to allow 
the state  court  to  decide  an  unclear  issue of state law of  great  local  importance);  Ala.  Pub.  Serv. 
Comm’n v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  341 U.S.  341, 345, 349–50 (1951) (deferring to  “state court  review of an 
administrative scheme based on predominantly local factors”); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 
332 (1943) (deferring to the state court regarding a complex state regulatory scheme); R.R. Comm’n v. 
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499–501 (1941) (abstaining to allow a state court to determine a state-law 
issue that would be dispositive to a constitutional claim).
40 See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 54 (1973) (stating that abstention is appropriate “where the 
challenged state statute is susceptible of a construction by the state judiciary that would avoid or modify 
the necessity of reaching a federal constitutional question”); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375–78 & 
n.11 (1959) (declining abstention where the state statutory question could not dispose of the federal 
constitutional issue).
41 Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 28;  see also Allegheny County v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 
191–96  (1959)  (holding  that  abstention  was  not  appropriate  where  there  were  no  “exceptional 
circumstances” or “important countervailing interest”).
42 See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 728–30 (1996) (holding that abstention on 
administrative-process and local-problem grounds is only appropriate in cases of discretionary relief); 
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 364 (1989) (limiting abstention 
to situations that would substantially interfere with administration of an essentially local program).
43 These ideologically neutral rules of construction have been called “quasi-constitutional law,” and 
can  be  used  by  the  Court  in  a  very  sophisticated  way to  promote  a  number  of  values,  including 
ideological ones, through its decision making.  William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,  Quasi-
Constitutional Law:  Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992).
44 Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 532 U.S. 189, 198 (2001) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 
919, 944 (1983)).
45 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 121 n.50 (1972) (citing Shuttlesworth v. City of 
Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 91 (1965)).
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face to violate the Constitution, if the state court has given the statute a 
narrower construction that would be constitutional, that construction will 
be upheld.46
B.  Rules Providing Less Deference to State Courts
Federal  courts  will  not  always  defer  to  state-court  determinations, 
however.  Even in the diversity context, federal courts have some flexibility 
to interpret state law.  If a State’s highest court has not spoken on the issue, 
federal courts are not required to certify a question to that court.  Nor do 
federal courts have to defer to the State’s appellate courts, unless federal 
courts are convinced that the state supreme court would agree.  In other 
words, federal courts are allowed to predict how the state supreme court 
would decide the issue.47
Additionally, there are many situations in the state-law-antecedent cases 
where federal courts will interpret what state law means, even if the federal 
court  also  gives  some  amount  deference  to  a  state-court  interpretation. 
State law is antecedent to a federal issue when the “existence, application 
or implementation of a federal right turns on the resolution of a logically 
antecedent issue of state law.”48  When the federal right depends in this way 
on an issue of state law, federal courts  have the ability and the duty to 
decide what  impact  the  state  law will  have on the  federal  law.49  That 
impact is actually a federal question, and not really interpretation of state 
law at all, even though the federal-court analysis may look as if the federal 
court  is  interpreting  the  state  law.50  Moreover,  even  in  a  state-law-
antecedent case in which the state court construction of the issue would 
resolve the matter and preclude consideration of the federal question, the 
federal  court  may still  need to  review the  state  law to some extent,  to 
ensure, at the least, that the law is not being construed to impair federal 
interests.51  As a practical matter, the Supreme Court will often interpret 
state law, rather than remand the matter to the State’s highest  court for 
46 Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 452–53 (2005) (per curiam) (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 
639, 654 (1990), overruled on other grounds, Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)).  Not exactly a rule 
of  construction,  is  the  related  doctrine  of  constitutional  avoidance.  It  is  an  approach  that  is  less 
deferential to the States than abstention, but is similar.  A federal court can decide a case based on a 
pendent state-law claim if doing so avoids the case’s constitutional issue; it need not refer to the State 
for decision.  Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 192–93 (1909).  This approach 
still affords the State significant deference by not calling the state law into constitutional question, and 
it avoids some of the problems posed by abstention, such as delay and increased cost.
47 CHARLES WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE,  FEDERAL COURTS § 58, at 396 (6th ed. 2002).  Additionally, 
the Supreme Court has traditionally deferred to the findings of lower federal courts regarding the law of 
a State within their jurisdiction.  Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 167 (1998) (“[There is 
a]  presumption of deference given the views of a  federal  court  as  to  the law of a State within its 
jurisdiction.”).   Deference is  not warranted,  however,  if  State expertise would not  be warranted in 
interpreting the state law.  Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 757 (2005) (overturning 
lower court’s  interpretation of state law where it  “did not  draw upon a deep well  of state-specific 
expertise”).
48 Herbert Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court:  Reflections on the Law and  
Logistics of Direct Review, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043, 1054 (1977).
49 Monaghan, supra note 26, at 1925–26, 1935–47.
50 Id. (analyzing the issue primarily in the context of constitutional cases, and referring to this as 
“characterization” of the issue for federal-law purposes).
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interpretation, when it must determine whether a right under a state statute 
was  unconstitutionally  denied,52 or  when  the  state  statute  itself  is 
unconstitutional.53
When a state court has spoken on the issue, the Supreme Court usually 
looks only far enough into the issue of state law to see whether the decision 
of the state court “rests upon a fair or substantial basis. . . . [I]f there is no 
evasion of the constitutional issue, and the nonfederal ground of decision 
has fair support, [the] Court will not . . . substitute its own view of what 
should  be  deemed  the  better  rule. . . .”54 This  fair-support  rule  applies 
generally to state-law-antecedent issues.
However, the Supreme Court does not always follow the fair-support 
rule.  For example, in  Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand the issue before 
the Court was whether a teacher had a vested contract right that could not 
be  impaired  under  the  Constitution’s  Contract  Clause.55  The  Indiana 
Supreme Court had ruled that she had no contract under Indiana law, but 
the  Supreme  Court  maintained  the  authority  to  address  the  question 
directly:
On  such  a  question,  one  primarily  of  state  law,  we  accord  respectful 
consideration and great weight to the views of the State’s highest court but, in 
order that  the constitutional mandate may not become a dead letter,  we are 
bound to decide for ourselves whether a contract was made, what are its terms 
and conditions,  and whether  the State  has,  by later  legislation,  impaired its 
obligation.   This  involves  an  appraisal  of  the  statutes  of  the  State  and  the 
decisions of its courts.56
The  Supreme  Court  determined  that,  contrary  to  the  Indiana  Supreme 
Court’s finding, the Indiana statutory scheme and the State’s actions under 
it created a contract between the teacher and the State that was protected 
under the Federal Constitution’s Contract Clause.57
51 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
498 (5th ed. 2003); Laura S. Fitzgerald, Suspecting the States:  Supreme Court Review of State-Court  
State-Law Judgments, 101 MICH. L. REV. 80, 83–85 (2002) (“[T]he Court routinely claims the power to 
review a state-law decision that blocked a state court from considering a federal claim . . . .”).
52 See Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938) (affording the state court some 
deference but ultimately deciding for itself whether a contract was made and, if so, whether the State 
failed to honor the contract).
53 See Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481, 482 (1942) (“Since validity of the state statute as 
construed was drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, we think the 
case is properly here on appeal . . . .”).
54 Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina ex rel. Daniel, 281 U.S. 537, 540–41 (1930).
55 303 U.S. 95, 96–99 (1938).  For the Constitution’s Contract Clause, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
56 Brand, 303 U.S. at 100 (internal citation omitted).
57 Id. at 105, 108–09.  One possible interpretation of the holding is that, rather than deciding the 
issue as a matter of state law, the Court was deciding the federal effect of the state laws, an issue of 
federal, not state law.  See General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 187 (1992) (“The question 
whether  a  contract  was  made  is  a  federal  question  for  purposes  of  Contract  Clause  analysis,  and 
‘whether it turns on issues of general or purely local law, we cannot surrender the duty to exercise our 
own judgment.’”  (internal  citation omitted)  (quoting Appleby v.  City  of  N.Y.,  271 U.S.  364,  380 
(1926))).  Professors Monaghan and Fallon argue that the Due Process Clause has some core conception 
of liberty and property, defined as matters of federal law, that state law must satisfy, but state law rarely 
fails to satisfy those thresholds.  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial  
Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 327–29 (1993); Henry Paul Monaghan, 
Of “Liberty” and “Property,” 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 440 (1977); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 
472, 484–86 (1995) (holding that state law mandating certain procedures to follow before a prison 
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Even though the Supreme Court found no evasion of the constitutional 
issue, the Court did not evaluate whether the state court’s interpretation of 
state  law  had  fair  support.58  Thus,  federal  supremacy  may  sometimes 
provide  a  basis  for  federal  courts  to  deviate  from the  normal  rules  of 
deference.
C.  Unifying the Two Approaches
This review of deference rules reveals that the amount of deference that 
federal  courts  afford  the  states  ranges  from total  abstention  from even 
considering a case to de novo review of state law.  The rules that have 
emerged  are  pragmatic  and  balance  State  autonomy  against  federal 
interests.59  Essentially, the traditional rule has embodied a dualist federal 
approach:  federal courts review issues of federal law, and state high court 
determinations are final on issues of state law.60  While this is generally 
true, federal courts are less likely to defer or affirmatively ask the State to 
interpret a state law when faced with a state-law-antecedent situation.
This  description  of  the  federal-court  approach  to  state-law  issues 
demonstrates that, in practice, the decisions of the federal court can appear 
ad  hoc  and  result-oriented.   And  when  judicial  federalism  cases  are 
compared  to  other  cases  considering  legislative  federalism,  the  federal 
courts’ approach seems even more confusing.  The Supreme Court appears 
to  sometimes  promote  States’  rights  and  to  sometimes  expand national 
power, without consistency.
Most  recently,  the  Rehnquist  Court  seemed to  breathe new life  into 
state power by limiting Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause and 
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, while also strengthening the 
Tenth and Eleventh Amendments.  In United States v. Lopez61 in 1995 and 
United States v. Morrison62 in 2000, for the first time since 1937, the Court 
struck down legislation as beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause power.63 
inmate could be disciplined did not by itself create a liberty interest; only a sentence that “imposes 
atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” would 
impair an inmate’s limited liberty interest).
58 The Court may have implicitly made this fair-support analysis by considering prior rulings by the 
Indiana Supreme Court.  See Brand, 303 U.S. at 107.
59 The rules  could actually  promote  an  ideological  purpose  of  the  Court,  rather  than  a  neutral 
federalism purpose.  See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller,  The Three Faces of Federalism:  An 
Empirical Assessment of Supreme Court Federalism Jurisprudence, 73  S. CAL. L. REV. 741, 745–46 
(2000).
60 See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 626 (1875) (deeming state courts the 
“appropriate tribunals” for state-law questions).
61 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (considering the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 
§ 1702, 104 Stat. 4789, 4844–45), superseded by statute, Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement 
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 320904, 108 Stat. 1796, 2125–26.
62 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (considering the Civil Rights Remedies for Gender-Motivated Violence Act, 
Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40302, 108 Stat. 1902, 1941–42 (1994)).
63 See Erwin Chemerinsky,  The  Rehnquist  Revolution,  2  PIERCE L.  REV. 1,  2–3  (2004).   Since 
Morrison, the Court seems to have stepped back from this states’-rights jurisprudence.  In Gonzales v.  
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 12–22 (2005), the Court upheld the Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 801–904 (2000), as valid Commerce Clause legislation that preempted California’s Compassionate 
Use Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2007).  The Compassionate Use Act had 
allowed individuals to grow small amounts of marijuana for their own use when a doctor recommended 
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In City of Boerne v. Flores,64 the Court limited Congress’s power to create 
legislative  rights  broader  than  the  constitutional  rights  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment created.65  That decision was applied to broaden the reach of 
the Eleventh Amendment, limiting Congress’s ability to subject the States 
to suits for money damages.66  Using the Tenth Amendment, as well, the 
Court during this time period limited federal power in New York v. United 
States67 and Printz v. United States.68  The Court has also taken a restrictive 
view  of  federal  power  in  habeas  corpus  jurisdiction69 and  civil  rights 
cases.70
the drug for serious medical conditions.  Id.  In its most recent decision on the topic, the Court avoided 
the federalism issue in a case involving the executive branch’s attempts to preempt the Oregon Death 
with Dignity Act,  OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.800–.897 (West Supp. 1998), which allows doctors to 
prescribe drugs to help terminally ill patients commit suicide, by finding that Congress failed to give the 
executive branch the power to prohibit doctors from prescribing these drugs.  Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 
S. Ct. 904, 916–22 (2006).
64 521 U.S. 507 (1997), superseded by statute, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2000).
65 See id. at 519–20, 536 (holding that, while Congress has broad authority under the Constitution to 
adopt  legislation to  protect  Fourteenth Amendment  rights,  the Court  retains  the right  to  determine 
whether such legislation amounts to an abuse of authority under the Constitution).
66 For examples of cases in which the requirements were not met for private individuals to recover 
money damages against the States, see Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of 
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 
U.S. 666 (1999); and Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 
(1999).  The Eleventh Amendment was strengthened in this way by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 
44 (1996), in which the Court held that Congress could abrogate state sovereign immunity only under 
its Fourteenth Amendment powers.  Id. at 57–60.  Not only are States immune from suit in federal 
court, but Congress cannot subject them to suit in their own courts either.  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 
706, 730–54 (1999).  For a thorough analysis of this Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, see Marcia L. 
McCormick,  Federalism Re-Constructed:  The Eleventh Amendment’s Illogical Impact on Congress’  
Power, 37. IND. L. REV. 345 (2004).
As in the Commerce Clause context, the Court seems to be stepping back here as well.  Four cases 
in the last three years have upheld Congress’s power.  In Nevada Department of Human Resources v.  
Hibbs,  538  U.S.  721  (2003),  the  Court  held  that  Congress  had  the  power  under  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment to enact the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–54 (2000).  In 
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004), the Court upheld Title II of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–65 (2000), as a valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity, at least as far as 
it mandated access to courthouses and other functions of government.  Then, in two bankruptcy cases, 
Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004), and Central Virginia Community 
College v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990 (2006), the Court held that Congress could subject the State to suit for 
in-rem bankruptcy proceedings under its Article I bankruptcy powers.
67 505 U.S. 144, 174–77 (1992) (holding that Congress could not coerce State governments into 
either accepting ownership of radioactive waste or implementing legislation dictated by Congress).
68 521  U.S.  898,  925–33  (1997)  (overturning  Congress’s  mandate  that  local  law  enforcement 
conduct background checks on applicants for gun permits as commandeering).
69 E.g., Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 318 (1995) (expressing concern that habeas filings threatened 
the  finality  of  state  court  judgments,  implicating  comity  and  federalism),  superseded  by  statute, 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101, 105, 106, 110 
Stat. 1214, 1217, 1220 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2255 (2000)).
70 E.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 476–85 (1996) (holding that preclearance 
under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000), cannot be denied simply 
because a jurisdiction’s voting procedures violate section 2 of the Act, id. § 1973); Growe v. Emison, 
507 U.S. 25, 32 (1993) (recognizing that, even though federal and state courts may have concurrent 
jurisdiction over  particular  subject  matter,  there are  circumstances  in  which  federalism and comity 
concerns dictate federal abstention).  But see Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1069 (1996) (5-4 decision) 
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Currently, in all but the Tenth Amendment context, the Court has issued 
subsequent  decisions  that  elevate  federal  interests  above  states  rights.71 
Furthermore,  at  the  same  time  that  it  issued  the  strong  states’-rights 
decisions described above, the Court also issued decisions that extend the 
national power in other areas.72
Taken  as  a  whole,  then,  the  Court’s  federalism  decisions  seem 
inconsistent  and  ideologically  based.73  The  following  section  of  this 
Article seeks to divine some nonideological guiding principles that federal 
courts can draw on to explain the level of deference they give to States in 
state-law issues.
III.  FEDERAL CONSIDERATION OF STATE-LEVEL INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE
There is a spectrum of options available to federal courts encountering 
state-court determinations of state law.  At one end of the spectrum, federal 
courts would abstain from hearing cases that involved issues of state law, 
or they would consider the cases but not consider the state-law issues at all, 
instead deferring entirely to any state determination of what the law means 
or how it should be applied to these facts.  At the other end of the spectrum, 
federal courts would review every issue of law or fact de novo, with no 
deference to any prior holdings by state courts either in the case before the 
federal court or in a prior, unrelated proceeding that would be precedential 
in state court.
While all of the cases fall along this continuum, federal courts rarely 
explain what reasoning underlies their decisions to defer or not.  A great 
number of the variances from the usual rule of deference can be explained, 
however,  by  notions  of  institutional  competency:   federal  courts  are 
deferring to the State institution that they perceive to be most competent to 
perform  the  task  at  issue  or  not  deferring  where  the  particular  State 
institution lacks special competency.
Federal-court  discourse  has  long  incorporated  the  concept  of 
institutional  competence,  usually  under  the  principle  of  separation  of 
powers.   That  notion  has  nearly  always  been  articulated  when  federal 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing the plurality opinion for going too far in limiting State discretion 
under the Voting Rights Act).
71 See supra notes 63, 66.
72 E.g., United States v.  Locke, 529 U.S.  89, 112–16 (2000) (holding that state laws governing 
design standards for oil tankers were preempted by federal law); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. 
Town of  Harrison,  520 U.S.  564,  575–88 (1997)  (striking down a state  tax  incentive  on Dormant 
Commerce Clause  grounds);  Morales  v.  TWA,  504 U.S.  374,  387–91 (1992)  (finding a  state  law 
regarding airline-fare advertising preempted by federal statute).  There have been a large number of 
preemption cases in recent years, some expanding the scope of federal power and some not.  For a full 
discussion of these preemption cases in a functional analysis, see Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, 
Preemption in the Rehnquist Court:  A Preliminary Empirical Assessment, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 
47 (2006), and Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey,  Backdoor Federalization, 53  UCLA L. 
REV. 1353, 1365–98 (2006).
73 See Cross  &  Tiller,  supra note  59,  at  757–62,  768;  David  Niven  &  Kenneth  W.  Miller, 
Federalism by Convenience:   The  Supreme Court’s  Judicial  Federalists  on  the  Death  Penalty  and  
States’ Rights Controversies, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 567 (2005); see also Jackson, Narratives, supra note 3, 
at  280 (arguing that  the Court’s record on protection of State power from federal  encroachment is 
suspect).
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courts employ it in a horizontal fashion, that is, when determining whether 
the federal  judicial  branch,  Congress,  or  the  President  is  more properly 
suited for a particular task.  Occasionally, though, state-level institutional 
competence has been the explicit  focus of federal courts.   Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s  concurrence  in  Bush  v.  Gore74 is  the  most  famous,  or 
infamous, example.
This  Part  analyzes  the  cases  in  which  the  Supreme  Court  has  not 
deferred to state-court interpretations of state law, with a particular focus 
on  those  cases  in  which  the  Court  has  explicitly  deferred  to  the  state 
legislative branch.  As part of this analysis, I distinguish between two kinds 
of  state  court  decisions:   interpretations  of  what  a  statute  means;  and 
discernment of  what  the purpose of  a  state law is.   The distinction has 
important implications.
In either context, I submit that, because the Federal Constitution rarely 
differentiates  between  the  branches  of  state  government,  federal  courts 
have little justification for doing so.  Ultimately, deciding which branch of 
state government should have primacy over any particular issue is a matter 
of state constitutional law.  In other words, just as federal judicial review is 
part of the federal courts’ constitutional power, the interpretation of state 
law is simply an exercise of the state courts’ state-constitutional power.  As 
such, the determination of the proper balance of that power should be up to 
each State.
A.  Independent Review in State Courts’ Interpretations of the Meaning or 
Content of State Law
In only a few cases has the Supreme Court admitted to engaging in 
independent review of the meaning of state law and of rejecting the state 
court’s interpretation of that law, and each of those instances was in service 
to  the  supremacy  of  an  important  and  substantive  federal  right  or 
enumerated power.  In Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, for example, 
the Supreme Court indepentendly reviewed Virginia law to determine the 
proper  title  to  land,  because  the  state-law  issues  were  antecedent  to 
deciding what rights the putative owner had under federal treaties.75  State 
hostility to the role of the Supreme Court and the supremacy of federal law 
at the time of the  Fairfax case may have made such rejection necessary.76 
Born out  of  similar resistance to federal  authority,  the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in  NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson77 and  Bouie v. City of  
74 For more information on Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence, see supra notes 7–8 and accompanying 
text.
75 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 618–28 (1813).  The Court explained its reasoning for deciding in this 
manner in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 357–58 (1816).
76 See Bush v Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 140 (2000) (per curiam) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing how 
Fairfax “occurred  amidst  vociferous  States’  rights  attacks  on  the  Marshall  Court”  (citing  GERALD 
GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN,  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 61–62 (13th ed. 1997))).  This hostility was 
based, at least in part, on State hostility to British creditors after the Revolutionary War.  See Wythe 
Holt,  “To Establish Justice”:  Politics,  the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal  
Courts, 1989  DUKE L.J. 1421, 1438–49 (discussing specific legal actions by States to prevent British 
creditors from recovering debts after the Revolutionary War).
77 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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Columbia78 rejected  state-supreme-court  deviations  from prior  state  law 
when  those  deviations  themselves  violated  due  process.79  Even  before 
State resistance to federal enforcement of civil  rights,  in  Indiana  ex rel.  
Anderson  v.  Brand, the  Supreme  Court  rejected  the  Indiana  Supreme 
Court’s  construction  of  state  law  where  that  construction  could  have 
arguably deprived a teacher of property without due process of law.80
Conversely, in most instances in which a state court is interpreting what 
a  state  statute  means,  federal  courts  will  defer  to  that  state  court’s 
interpretation.81  But this is not always the case.  The most controversial 
example is Bush v. Gore, in which a majority of the Supreme Court ordered 
an end to a recount of ballots cast in the 2000 presidential election.82  The 
majority  held  that  no  constitutionally  permissible  recount  could  be 
accomplished  by  a  deadline  that  gave  the  States  a  “safe-harbor,”  even 
though the Florida Supreme Court was given no opportunity to determine 
whether the legislature intended to meet this deadline in situations like the 
one presented.83  Rather than remand to the Florida Supreme Court to order 
that the recount proceed in a method consistent with Florida’s election law, 
the Supreme Court held that no constitutional method could complete the 
recount in time to comply with what the Court interpreted the election law 
to require.84
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence went further.  In it he argued that 
the  Florida  Supreme  Court  misinterpreted  Florida  election  law when  it 
ordered  the  recount  and,  thus,  impermissibly  thwarted  the  will  of  the 
Florida Legislature.85  As a precursor to this conclusion, the Chief Justice 
argued that the United States Supreme Court had a duty under Article II of 
the  United  States  Constitution,  which  assigns  the  power  to  direct  the 
appointment of electors to the legislatures of the States, to ensure that the 
state judicial branch was faithful to the will of the state legislative branch.86 
He explained that  given this  federal  constitutional  duty,  the  review and 
rejection of the state court interpretation of state law “does not imply a 
78 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
79 Id. at 350, 362 (“We think it clear that the South Carolina Supreme Court, in applying its new 
construction of the statute to affirm these convictions, has deprived petitioners of rights guaranteed to 
them by the Due Process Clause.”); Patterson, 357 U.S. at 455, 457–58 (“Novelty in [state] procedural 
requirements cannot be permitted to thwart review in this Court applied for by those who, in justified 
reliance upon prior decisions, seek vindication in state courts of their federal constitutional rights.”).
80 303 U.S. 95, 108–10 (1938).  The Court may have based its decision on the fact that the Indiana 
Supreme Court had changed its interpretation of state law in holding that Brand did not have a contract. 
Id. at 107.  Thus, Brand may be completely analogous to Martin, Bouie, and Patterson.  For a detailed 
discussion of Brand, see infra Part II.B.
81 See Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 916 (1997) (“Neither this Court nor any other federal 
tribunal has any authority to place a construction on a state statute different from the one rendered by 
the highest court of the state.”); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992) (holding the state 
court’s interpretation of a local ordinance binding); United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 
402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971) (plurality opinion, in a part joined by five justices) (“[W]e lack jurisdiction 
authoritatively to construe state legislation.”); see also Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 483 (1993) 
(contrasting interpretation of a state statute with conclusions about what effect the statute has).
82 531 U.S. 98, 105–11 (2000) (per curiam).
83 Id. at 110–11.
84 Id. at 111.
85 Id. at 116–22 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
86 Id. at 111–13 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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disrespect  for  state  courts but  rather  a  respect  for  the  constitutionally 
prescribed role of state legislatures.”87
Thus, where state courts are suspected of undermining the supremacy of 
the  federal  government  as  an  institution,  depriving  an  individual  of  a 
federal constitutional right, or otherwise violating an express provision of 
the Constitution, federal courts will not defer to those courts.88
B.  Independent Review in the Statutory-Purpose Context
Another, less-analyzed area is state-court declarations of the purpose of 
legislation.  The purpose of legislation or of other government action is an 
important  consideration  in  First,  Fifth,  and  Fourteenth  Amendment 
constitutional analysis, as well as Dormant Commerce Clause analysis.  In 
these contexts,  the courts apply varying levels of scrutiny, based on the 
type of legislation at issue and the interest at stake.  These levels of scrutiny 
embody  varying  levels  of  deference  to  the  States.   Some  types  of 
restrictions and classifications are simply not allowed.  For example, in the 
Establishment  Clause  context,  the  government  may  not  impose  a 
requirement or restriction on individuals for a religious purpose.89  Other 
restrictions and classifications are given strict scrutiny:  the law must be the 
least restrictive means to achieve a compelling state interest.90  Still others 
receive intermediate scrutiny:  the law must be substantially related to an 
important state interest.91  The vast majority of legislation receives rational-
basis  review:   the  law  must  be  rationally  related  to  a  legitimate 
governmental purpose.92
For  strict  and  intermediate  scrutiny,  the  State  bears  the  burden  of 
demonstrating that the purpose of the legislation is to promote the right 
87 Id. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
88 Laura S. Fitzgerald has argued that these should be the only times that federal courts should fail 
to defer to state court interpretations of state law.  Fitzgerald, supra note 51, at 89, 91–99.
89 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (holding that statutes related to religion 
must have a secular legislative purpose, have “principal or primary effect . . . that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion,” and “must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion’” (quoting 
Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970))).
90 See,  e.g.,  Wygant  v.  Jackson Bd. of Educ.,  476 U.S.  267,  273–74 (1986) (plurality  opinion) 
(holding that differential treatment on the basis of race can only be upheld where it is justified by a 
“compelling governmental interest” and is “narrowly tailored” to meet that goal (quoting Palmore v. 
Sidoti,  466 U.S.  429,  432 (1984),  and Fullilove v.  Klutznick,  448 U.S.  448,  480 (1980) (plurality 
opinion), overruled on other grounds, Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1980))).
91 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (holding that Virginia did not show 
an important enough interest in maintaining its single-sex military academy).
92 See, e.g., Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1993) (applying rational-basis review 
to Kentucky statutes that required different standards of evidence for involuntary commitment based on 
mental retardation and mental illness).  Justice O’Connor has suggested that there should be an even 
lower threshold for invalidating state legislation under the Commerce Clause than the standard used 
under the Due Process Clause because a federal court decision on Commerce Clause grounds may be 
overcome more easily by the legislature.  ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho St. Tax Comm’n, 458 U.S. 307, 350 
n.14 (1982) (O’Connor, J., dissenting);  see also Richard A. Cordray & James T. Vradelis, Comment, 
The Emerging Jurisprudence of Justice O’Connor, 52  U. CHI.  L. REV. 389, 419 (1985) (noting that 
Justice O’Connor’s ASARCO footnote might have far-reaching implications for federal court deference 
to state statutes that are suspect under the Due Process Clause).
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kind of  governmental  interest.93  For rational-basis  review, on the other 
hand, the burden is on the challenger to demonstrate either that there is no 
legitimate  governmental  interest  or  that  there  is  no  rational  relationship 
between  the  interest  and  the  means  chosen  by  the  legislature.94  The 
legislature need not articulate that purpose, and if it does not, the courts 
will evaluate whether any plausible legitimate purpose could be behind the 
legislation.95  This  test  is  not  completely  boundless,  however:   the 
legislature must have been able to reasonably consider the legislative facts 
before  it  to  be  true.96  Still,  those  facts  need  not  actually  be  true;  that 
legislative facts turn out to be mistaken is not a reason to reject a purpose 
based on those facts.97
The Supreme Court has stated that it affords deference to state court 
declarations of purpose similar, if not quite at the same level, to that which 
it affords interpretations of meaning.98  For example, in United States Term 
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, the Court stated, “[w]e must, of course, accept the 
state court’s view of the purpose of its own law . . . .”99 Similarly, in Allen 
v. Illinois, both the majority and the dissent agreed that the state court was 
the authority on both the meaning and purpose of state law.100  In fact, the 
rules that the Supreme Court has developed will sometimes lead to greater 
deference to findings of purpose.  For example, the Supreme Court has held 
that the purpose of a state law is a question of fact,101 and that the parties 
93 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532–33 (stating that, in intermediate scrutiny cases, the State bears the 
burden of showing an important governmental objective and that the means are substantiallly related to 
that objective); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922 (1995) (holding that, in the strict scrutiny context, 
the State may not simply assert that the interest to be served is compelling and the means narrowly 
tailored, but must provide strong evidence of it).
94 See Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 109 (2003) (explaining that the 
burden is on the challenging party in such cases to “‘negative every conceivable basis’  that might 
support different treatment” (quoting Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940))).
95 See,  e.g.,  Nordlinger  v.  Hahn,  505  U.S.  1,  15  (1992)  (stating  that  rational-basis  analysis 
“require[s] that a purpose may conceivably or ‘may reasonably have been the purpose and policy’ of the 
relevant governmental decisionmaker” (quoting Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 
528–29 (1959))).
96 Id. at 11 (citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981)).
97 Clover  Leaf,  449  U.S.  at  464 (“Where  there  was  evidence  before  the  legislature  reasonably 
supporting classification, litigants may not procure invalidation of the legislation merely by tendering 
evidence in court that the legislature was mistaken.”).
98 This qualification was noted by Justice Breyer in his dissent in  Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 
346, 383–84 (1997) (5-4 decision) (Breyer, J., dissenting), although it is not made explicit in the cases 
that he cites.
99 514 U.S. 779, 829 (1995).
100 478 U.S. 364, 367 (5-4 decision) (1986) (accepting the state court’s interpretation of purpose, but 
also analyzing the statute); accord id. at 380 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the State is the final 
authority on both meaning and purpose, but disagreeing with the effect of the statute).
101 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005) (treating the question of the purpose 
of a government action, eminent domain, as a question of fact); Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 
543–44 (1982) (treating the question of legislative intent as one of fact).  Although the law at issue in 
Crawford was a proposition amending the California Constitution, the Supreme Court did not indicate 
that the type of state law made a difference in the analysis.  It does not seem that a statute’s purpose  
should be treated more like a question of law.  Certainly state-court interpretations of the meaning of 
state  constitutional  provisions  should  be  given  enormous  deference:   because  those  constitutions 
embody a particularly sovereign interest, the state courts are uniquely situated to interpret that meaning, 
and  federal  courts  are  not  competent  to  second-guess  the  state  courts,  except  in  extremely  rare 
circumstances.  However, the issue here is not one of meaning, but rather one of purpose, which is more  
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may present  evidence on the  subject.102  Questions of  fact  are routinely 
afforded high levels of deference.103
Despite  these  assertions,  the  Supreme Court  has  rejected  state-court 
findings of purpose in several cases.  In the Establishment Clause context, 
the Court has stated that, “[w]hile the Court is normally deferential to a 
State’s articulation of a secular purpose, it is required that the statement of 
such purpose be sincere and not a sham.”104  Because Establishment Clause 
cases warrant a very searching review, this result seems analogous to those 
cases involving meaning where the Court suspected state courts of evading 
Supreme Court review.
In the context of  rational-basis  review as well,  though,  the Supreme 
Court has rejected state-court findings of purpose.  In Allegheny Pittsburgh 
Coal  Co.  v.  County Commission,  both state  statute  and the constitution 
provided that property tax valuation be based on a particular criterion.105 
The Supreme Court rejected a state-court finding that the legislature could 
have intended to allow valuation based on a  different  and incompatible 
criterion.106
In  these  examples  the  Supreme  Court  rejected  expansive  state-court 
interpretations of purpose meant to find state legislation legitimate, but, in 
at  least  two  recent  cases,  the  Court  has  also  rejected  the  limiting 
interpretations of purpose state courts have used to strike down legislation. 
like a historical fact than is the slippery notion of group intent.
102 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938) (“Where the existence of a 
rational basis for legislation whose constitutionality is attacked depends upon facts beyond the sphere of 
judicial notice, such facts may properly be made the subject of judicial inquiry” (citing Borden’s Farm 
Prods. Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194 (1934))).  It is not enough to provide evidence that the legislature 
was mistaken, however:
[Parties  challenging  legislation]  cannot  prevail  so  long  as  “it  is  evident  from  all  the 
considerations presented to [the legislature], and those of which we may take judicial notice, 
that  the  question  is  at  least  debatable.”   Where  there  was  evidence  before  the  legislature 
reasonably supporting the classification, litigants may not procure invalidation of the legislation 
merely by tendering evidence in court that the legislature was mistaken.
Clover Leaf, 449 U.S. at 464 (alterations in Clover Leaf) (quoting Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 154). 
This  is  not the type of proof at  issue in  Fitzgerald or  Kansas v.  Hendricks,  521 U.S.  346 (1997), 
discussed  infra notes  108–130 and accompanying text.  Those cases concerned evidence of what the 
legislature considered and intended, not of the validity of the facts before the legislature.
103 Fed.  R.  Civ.  P.  52(a)  (stating  that  “[f]indings  of  fact  shall  not  be  set  aside  unless  clearly 
erroneous”).
104 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586–87 (1987) (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 64 
(1985) (Powell, J., concurring));  see also Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 75 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing 
that the secular-purpose requirement is meaningful because “our courts are capable of distinguishing a 
sham secular purpose from a sincere one”); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (per curiam) 
(holding that the avowed secular purpose of a statute would not blind the Court when the statute had a 
plainly religious nature); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223–24 (1963) (holding that 
the implementation of a purportedly secular practice made clear its religious nature).
105 488 U.S. 336, 345 (1989).
106 Id. at 345; see also Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1992) (distinguishing another unequal 
tax assessment on the basis that “Allegheny Pittsburgh was the rare case where the facts precluded any 
plausible inference that the reason for the unequal assessment practice was to achieve the benefits of an 
acquisition-value tax scheme”).  In another situation in which the Supreme Court defended its decision 
to  construe  purpose  broadly,  the  Court  distinguished  a  prior  case  that  had  not  construed  purpose 
broadly.  Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959) (distinguishing  Wheeling 
Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 572 (1949), by stating, “[h]aving themselves specifically declared 
their purpose, the Ohio statutes left no room to conceive of any other purpose for their existence”).
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In  Kansas v. Hendricks,107 a Kansas man challenged the State’s Sexually 
Violent Predator Act,108 arguing, among other things, that it was a punitive 
statute that violated the federal constitutional prohibitions against double 
jeopardy and ex post facto laws.109  The Supreme Court treated the question 
of whether the statute was civil or criminal as a matter of law, and thus a 
question  of  statutory  construction.110  The  Court  then  looked  at  the 
placement of  the statute in the Kansas codes and analyzed the statute’s 
language and structure.111  The Court found that two things manifested the 
intent of the legislature that the statute not be punitive, and therefore not 
criminal:  (1) the placement of the statute in the probate code; and (2) the 
statement  within  the  statute  that  its  purpose  was  to  create  a  civil 
commitment procedure.112
Previously,  the  Kansas  Supreme  Court  had  held,  despite  these  two 
points,  that  the  “overriding”  purpose  of  the  statute  was  punitive—to 
segregate people subject to it from the public—and that any treatment was 
“incidental, at best.”113  The court held this in part because the legislature 
had stated in its declaration of purpose that sexually violent predators could 
not be treated under the existing civil commitment statute, which provided 
for commitment of people with mental illnesses, and because no effort had 
been made to  treat  any offenders.114  Accordingly,  the  Kansas  Supreme 
Court held that the primary purpose of the statute was to incarcerate, not to 
provide treatment.115
The United States Supreme Court rejected this formulation, finding that 
the statute could have more than one purpose, and noting that the mere 
possibility  that  the  Kansas  legislature  could  have  intended  for  sexually 
violent predators to have treatment, in an ideal situation, was enough to 
make this a civil statute.116
Justice  Breyer  dissented,  arguing  that  the  statute  contained  enough 
punitive aspects that its purpose was ambiguous.117  Given that ambiguity, 
Justice Breyer argued that the finding by the Kansas Supreme Court, that 
the purpose of the statute was to incapacitate and not to treat offenders, 
should be entitled to deference.118
107 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (5-4 decision).
108 KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a21 (2005).
109 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360–61.
110 Id. at 361 (citing Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368 (1986)).
111 Id. at 361–67.
112 Id. at 362.
113 In re Care & Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan. 1996), rev’d sub nom. Kansas v. 
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
114 Id. at 136.  The state supreme court found it particularly troubling that the statute did not even 
allow for treatment until after a sexually violent predator had served the original criminal sentence.  Id. 
(quoting Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 753 (W.D. Wash. 1995),  rev’d en banc,  No. CV-94-
00480C (W.D. Wash. Feb. 10, 1998),  aff’d, 192 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 1999),  rev’d sub nom. Seling v. 
Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001)).
115 Id.
116 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 367–69.
117 Id. at 379–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
118 Id. at 384–85.  Justice Breyer supported the finding of the Kansas Supreme Court by analyzing 
the statute and the record, which detailed the lack of effort made to treat Hendricks.  Id. at 385–95.
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Six  years  later,  Justice  Breyer  delivered  the  unanimous  opinion  in 
Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Central Iowa, refusing to defer to the Iowa 
Supreme Court’s finding of purpose.119  At issue in Fitzgerald was a tax on 
the proceeds of slot machines at the State’s racetracks and riverboats; these 
proceeds were  the  primary source of  revenue for  both types  of  gaming 
establishment.120  At  the  State’s  horse  and dog racetracks,  slot  machine 
proceeds were taxed at a maximum of 36%, while at the State’s riverboats, 
they were taxed at a maximum of 20%.121  Finding that the proceeds were 
similarly  situated,  the  Iowa  Supreme  Court  then  found  the  scheme 
irrational because the tax frustrated the purpose of  the act creating it.122 
The purpose found by the Iowa Supreme Court was to promote the State’s 
racing  industry  in  an  effort  to  make  an  unprofitable  venture  profitable 
again.123  Taxing the proceeds at the racetracks at a rate so much higher 
than that of the riverboats damaged their profitability, defeating the purpose 
of the act.124
The racetracks argued that when the state court determined the purpose 
of the act, it was interpreting Iowa law, and that interpretation deserved the 
usual deference.125  In other words, that interpretation was binding on the 
United States Supreme Court.126  Here it  would mean that  the Supreme 
Court was bound by the state-court finding that the purpose of the statute at 
issue was to promote the racing industry in Iowa.127  With that threshold, it 
would follow that the differential tax rate could not be rationally related to 
that purpose.
The Supreme Court did not agree that it owed any deference to the state 
court.  Rather than accept the purpose the state court found—the actual128 
purpose—the Supreme Court theorized multiple  potential legitimate State 
interests to which the differential tax could be rationally related.  Finding 
this  rational  relationship,  the  Court  upheld  the  tax  under  the  Federal 
Constitution.129  To justify its decision not to defer to the state court, the 
119 539 U.S. 103, 110 (2003).
120 Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 648 N.W.2d 555, 557, 559 (Iowa 2002),  rev’d, 539 
U.S. 103 (2003).
121 IOWA CODE ANN. § 99F.4A(6), .11 (West 2004).
122 Fitzgerald, 648 N.W.2d at 561.
123 Id. at 560.
124 Id. at 560–62.  Before the Iowa Supreme Court, the State argued that the purpose of the act was to 
encourage economic growth and promote agriculture.  Id. at 560.  The court found that, even if this 
were the purpose of the act, this purpose, too, was frustrated by the higher tax rate on racetracks.  Id. at 
561.
125 Transcript  of Oral  Argument at  26, Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Cent.  Iowa, 539 U.S.  103 
(2003) (No. 02-695).
126 See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 607–08 (1875) (holding that state 
courts are the final interpreters of state law, with the United States Supreme Court limited to reviewing 
only questions of federal law).
127 This was the stated purpose of the legislation.  Fitzgerald, 648 N.W.2d at 560–61.
128 I use this term here to highlight the approach of the Iowa Supreme Court and not necessarily as 
an endorsement of the correctness of that court’s holding.
129 Not  to  be  outdone,  the  Iowa  Supreme  Court  later  struck  down  the  tax  under  the  Iowa 
Constitution’s Equal Protection provision, although it did so not by creating a separate test under its 
constitution but through an “independent application” of the federal test.  Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. 
Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 6–7 (Iowa 2004) (citing William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the  
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 500 (1977)).  There is no (federal) question that 
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Supreme Court stated, “the Constitution grants legislators, not courts, broad 
authority (within the bounds of rationality) to decide whom they wish to 
help with their tax laws and how much help those laws ought to provide.”130 
In other  words,  rather  than defer  to  the  state  court,  the  Supreme Court 
deferred to the state legislature.
While this may seem analogous to Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence in 
Bush v. Gore, which relied on the Constitution’s delegation of authority to 
the  state  legislative  branch,  one  important  ingredient  is  missing.   The 
Constitution  does  not  expressly  delegate  the  authority  to  set  state 
nonelectoral policy to the state legislative branch.  That power would be 
reserved to the State as a whole, as evidenced by the Tenth Amendment, 
which makes no distinction between the branches of state government.131
Certainly, there may be other arguments that support the decision to 
defer to a particular branch of state government in the purpose context that 
are  different  from  those  in  the  meaning  context.   For  example,  less 
deference may be warranted in the meaning context because the difference 
between saying what  a statute means and saying why it  exists  suggests 
different institutional competencies.  First, saying what a statute means has 
a  more  powerful  effect  on  individuals  than  does  stating  the  statute’s 
purpose.   The language and meaning of  the statute  determine how that 
statute will operate on the world and how it will curtail people’s behavior 
or penalize them for that behavior.  Conversely, the purpose of legislation 
has very little direct effect on the world, simply being the context in which 
the legislation arose or an aspirational statement in the enacted legislation. 
That  context  or  aspirational  statement  can be used to  help interpret  the 
meaning, or, given an improper purpose, it can make the statute invalid. 
However,  the  purpose,  by  itself,  usually  changes  nothing  in  practice. 
Because it is not the purpose of a statute that affects people, but rather, the 
language or meaning of the statute that does so, declaring the purpose runs 
little risk of curtailing liberty or impairing individual rights.  Accordingly, 
as there is little reason to worry that the legislature could oppress political 
minorities by its purpose alone, this provides more of a reason to defer to 
the legislative branch in discerning purpose.
A second argument might be that, as the body that saw the need for the 
legislation in the  first  place and created it,  the  legislature is  in  a  better 
position than are the courts to say why a particular statute is needed.  Thus, 
when  the  legislative  act  is  presumptively  valid—in  other  words,  when 
rational basis would apply under a constitutional analysis—federal courts 
must defer to legislative possibilities rather than to the holdings of courts. 
Conversely,  where  the  judicial  branch  has  greater  competence,  such  as 
when it interprets statutory meaning, giving effect to legislative intent and 
the Iowa court could apply the federal test and reach a result that the United States Supreme Court had 
rejected, as long as the Iowa court’s result rested on the Iowa Constitution.  See Robert F. Williams, 
State  Courts  Adopting Federal  Constitutional  Doctrine:   Case-by-Case  Adoptionism or  Prospective 
Lockstepping?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499, 1501, 1514 (2005).
130 Fitzgerald, 539 U.S. at 108.
131 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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culling  a  single  meaning  from multiple  actors,  the  state  judicial  branch 
warrants deference.
Yet  an equally  persuasive argument  could be  made to  treat  purpose 
interpretations with more, rather than less, deference.  Federal courts have 
expertise equal to that of state courts in interpreting statutory language, and 
statutory interpretation is something that all U.S. courts do.  The search for 
meaning is a matter of construction of language, clearly a question of law. 
However,  discerning the  purpose or  purposes of  a  law is  not  an act  of 
construction, necessarily, and may not be a question of law at all.  Rather, 
discerning a purpose may be more like finding a fact, a point the Supreme 
Court itself seems to have accepted.132
Whether it is a question of fact or an unusual question of law, state 
courts, as part of the state government, are in a much better position than 
are federal courts to understand why particular state legislation was passed. 
State judges are more likely, than are their federal counterparts, to know 
what  the  public  debate  over  the  issues  was  when  the  legislation  was 
created.  State judges are also more likely to have some insight into the 
state legislative  process.   Thus,  state courts  are  in  a substantially  better 
position  to  interpret  the  purpose  of  state  legislation  than  are  federal 
courts.133
C.  Separation of Powers at the State Level
The lesson to be taken from all of these cases and modes of deference is 
that, where the Constitution affords leeway to the States, the Court is likely 
to defer to the state legislative branch at the expense of the state judiciary. 
This was implied by the majority in Hendricks, and it was stated explicitly 
by the Court in Fitzgerald.  Conversely, where the Constitution limits State 
power, the Court is more likely to defer to the interpretation of state law by 
state courts, unless there is a reason to suspect the courts themselves of 
interpreting the state law in order to mask a constitutional violation, or to 
deprive a party of due process or equal protection.134
But there is  nothing in the Federal  Constitution that  warrants giving 
deference to the state legislative branch at the expense of the state judicial 
branch in the majority of situations.  The Federal Constitution does not 
distinguish between state legislative and judicial branches in describing the 
132 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005) (treating the purpose of government 
action as a question of fact);  Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 543–44 (1982) (treating the 
question of legislative intent of a constitutional proposition as one of fact).
133 On yet another side, the existence of the Fourteenth Amendment may suggest that States cannot 
be trusted to tell  the truth about what the purpose of some legislation is if that legislation impacts 
individual  rights.   See Richard  L.  Aynes,  On  Misreading  John  Bingham  and  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57, 71–74 (1993) (chronicling John Bingham’s advocacy of the Fourteenth 
Amendment  as  a  means  to  enforce  the  Bill  of  Rights  on  the  States  that  were  disregarding  the 
Constitution).
134 This  was  Justice  Rehnquist’s  stated  reason  for  deferring  to  the  legislative  branch  in  his 
concurrence in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 115 (2000) (per curiam) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  See 
also Helen Hershkoff,  State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”:  Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1900–01 (2001) (arguing that deference by federal courts to state sovereignty in 
these  cases  is  preferable  because  it  leaves  room for  the  state  political  process,  rather  than  federal 
judicial mandate and private suits, to remedy constitutional violations).
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powers of each.135  The only constitutional provision that limits the form 
the state government may take and the distribution of powers within state 
government is the Guarantee Clause, which provides, “[t]he United States 
shall  guarantee  to  every  State  in  this  Union  a  Republican  Form  of 
Government,  and  shall  protect  each  of  them  against  Invasion;  and  on 
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature 
cannot  be  convened),  against  domestic  Violence.”136  Not  only  is  the 
Constitution silent about how States organize themselves within the bounds 
of a republican form of government,137 the Supreme Court has held that 
interpretation of this Clause is a political question and not justiciable.138
State constitutions, then, define how state governments are to be formed 
and how various governmental powers should be exercised.  Because the 
institutions  of  state  government  are  not  identical  to  their  federal 
counterparts, the competence of those institutions is not identical to that of 
their federal counterparts, and their powers need not be separated in exactly 
the same way.139  In fact, state constitutions often give the judicial branch a 
135 It is true, as Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in his concurrence in  Bush v. Gore, that Article II, 
Section 1, delegates the power to determine how to elect presidential electors to the legislature of each 
State.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.  Article I, Section 4, which details how members of Congress shall 
be elected, also refers to state legislatures but contrasts that power with Congress’s power, rather than 
the  power  of  the  state  judicial  branch.   See U.S.  CONST. art.  I,  § 4.   In  other  places  as  well,  the 
Constitution refers to different branches of state government, assuming a structure somewhat similar to 
that of the federal  government.   See Michael  C.  Dorf,  The Relevance of  Federal  Norms for State 
Separation of Powers, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 51, 54–58 (1998) (illustrating that the amendment 
procedure of Article V assumes a distinct state executive and state legislature, and Article III assumes 
the existence of a state judicial branch).  No section suggests anything about the primacy of one branch 
over another.  Moreover, there is no historical support for the significance of the language in Article II. 
See generally Hayward H. Smith, History of the Article II Independent State Legislature Doctrine, 29 
FLA.  ST.  U.  L.  REV. 731,  783–84  (2001)  (concluding  that  the  Framers  of  the  Constitution  never 
understood  Article  II  to  show  any  particular  solicitude  towards  state  legislatures  and  that  it  has 
historically only been used in make-weight arguments by politicians and courts).
136 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
137 This silence has not uniformly been interpreted to mean that the Constitution fails to limit the 
exercise of power within state government.  See Dorf, supra note 135, at 58 (arguing that the structure 
of the Federal Constitution implies that States should be organized in federal-style separation of powers 
terms); Louis H. Pollak,  Judicial Power and “The Politics of the People,” 72 YALE L.J. 81, 88 (1962) 
(stating that the Federal Constitution “postulated the  idea of” a tripartite arrangement like that of the 
federal government).
138 See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849) (determining that the question of selection 
among competing state constitutions was valid for Congress to decide because “the Constitution of the 
United States . . . has treated the subject as political in its nature, and placed the power in the hands of 
that department”).  That the issue is a political question does not leave the States entirely unregulated. 
The federal government must guarantee that  a  State’s form of government is republican, and, with 
federal courts out of the picture, it is up to Congress to interpret what that means.  Congress has not 
spoken on the subject.
Congress’s power is probably not unbounded.  The Court’s opinion in  Baker v. Carr may have 
signaled that, in the right case, the Court will interpret issues touching on the Guarantee Clause.  369 
U.S. 186, 208–32 (1962); see also Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: 
Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 70–78 (1988) (arguing that the Guarantee Clause 
is  a  judicially  enforceable  limit  on  federal  power).   The  Supreme  Court  has  suggested,  based  on 
Merritt’s argument, that the Clause might limit Congress’s power to regulate State activities and would, 
in  those  cases,  be  justiciable.   See New York  v.  United  States,  505  U.S.  144,  185  (1992)  (citing 
Merritt’s argument but not reaching the issue); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463 (1991) (same).
139 In fact, the Supreme Court has noted that this issue is a matter of state constitutional law:
Whether the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of a State shall be kept altogether distinct 
and separate, or whether persons or collections of persons belonging to one department may, in 
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much broader role in government than that possessed by the federal judicial 
branch.140  For  example,  state  courts  are  not  bound  by  Article  III’s 
justiciability doctrines and, in fact, often share a policy-making role with 
the legislative branch.141  Conversely, in some instances, state courts have a 
narrower role in government than does the federal judicial branch.142  Thus, 
separation of powers operates quite differently at the state level, and among 
the States, from how it operates at the federal level,143 but it remains an 
issue of state constitutional law.
Federal separation-of-powers doctrine limits the power of federal courts 
to  strike  down  federal  legislation,  on  the  ground  that  unelected  judges 
should not be given the chance to frustrate the will of the majority, except 
in a few instances.144  In every case involving legislation, there is a chance 
that the court could frustrate the will of the majority.  It is easy to see that 
when  a  court  strikes  down  legislation  as  unconstitutional  the  court  is 
countering  the  will  of  the  majority,  but  that  is  only  the  tip  of  the 
respect to some matters, exert powers which, strictly speaking, pertain to another department of 
government, is for the determination of the State.
Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902);  see also Risser v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 549, 552 (7th Cir. 
1991) (holding that the States need not have the same separation of powers limitations as the federal 
government);  G.  ALAN TARR,  UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3  (1998)  (emphasizing  that  state 
constitutions, not the Federal Constitution, dictate the distribution of power among the branches of state 
government ); James A. Gardner,  State Courts as Agents of Federalism:  Power and Interpretation in  
State Constitutional Law, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1725, 1744–46 (2003) (listing the variety of ways 
state constitutions separate powers); Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1884–86 (noting that States are not 
required  to  imitate  the  federal  separation  of  powers  system, and observing the  variety  of  systems 
developed across the States).  Federal courts lack jurisdiction to determine whether State actions violate 
the  state’s  constitution.   Calder  v.  Bull,  3  U.S.  (3  Dall.)  386,  392  (1798)  (“[T]his  court  has  no 
jurisdiction to determine that any law of any state  Legislature,  contrary to the Constitution of such 
State, is void.”).
140 Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1844–76 (illustrating the ways in which state courts “undertake and 
discharge functions that are conventionally deemed beyond the Article III power”); Hans A. Linde, The 
State and the Federal Courts in Governance:  Vive la Différence!, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1273, 1273–
79  (2005)  (highlighting  the  extent  to  which  “state  courts  take  on  responsibilities  federal  courts 
decline”).
141 See Hershkoff,  supra note  134,  at  1861–68  (discussing  the  extent  to  which  state  courts  are 
involved in matters that would be nonjusticiable as political questions for Article III courts).
142 See Jim Rossi,  Dual Constitutions and Constitutional Duels:  Separation of Powers and State  
Implementation of Federally Inspired Regulatory Programs and Standards, 46  WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1343, 1359–62, 1375–80 (2005) (discussing the strong nondelegation principle in state constitutional 
law and other differences from federal organization of powers).
143 See Stanley H. Friedelbaum, State Courts and Separation of Powers:  A Venerable Doctrine in 
Varied  Contexts,  61  ALB.  L.  REV. 1417,  1458–59  (1998)  (suggesting  that  separation  of  powers  is 
becoming  more  meaningful  in  the  States);  Hershkoff,  supra note  134,  at  1882–98  (discussing  the 
differences  between  federal  and  state  legislatures  and  judiciaries);  see  also Robert  A.  Schapiro, 
Contingency and Universalism in State Separation of Powers Discourse, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 
79, 88–94, 99–107 (1998) (arguing that differences at the state and federal level counsel against the 
States’ routine practive of adopting federal separation-of-powers concepts).
144 See REDISH,  supra note  15,  at  5,  17–19  (discussing  the  theoretical  legitimacy  of  judicial 
abstention);  Martin  H.  Redish,  Federal  Judicial  Independence:   Constitutional  and  Political  
Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697, 707–08 (1995) (noting the Framers’ intent to limit the scope of 
what  appointed  judges  can  hear,  to  prevent  them  from threatening  the  representative  branches  of 
government).  As the Supreme Court has said, federal courts may exercise power only “‘in the last 
resort, and as a necessity,’ and only when adjudication is ‘consistent with a system of separated powers 
and [the dispute is one] traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.’” 
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (alteration in Allen) (quoting Chi. & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. 
Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892), and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968)).
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countermajoritarian  iceberg.   Every  time  a  court  is  asked  to  interpret 
legislation it  risks frustrating the will  of the majority, because the court 
might come to a meaning different from what the majority of legislators 
intended.145  Similarly,  even  where  the  court  has  interpreted  the  statute 
“correctly,” the court might apply the statute to reach a conclusion different 
from what  a  majority  of  legislators  would  have  reached.   Thus,  every 
interaction between federal courts and a legislative enactment brings with it 
an inherent risk of contermajoritarian action.146  Because of this risk, many 
scholars  contend  that  federal  courts  should  intervene  only  where 
intervention is necessary to protect the political minority from a tyranny of 
the majority.147
The countermajoritarian concern is not as warranted for many States as 
it is for the federal government, and thus the state court powers need not be 
quite so limited.  Many States elect their judges, and once elected, because 
they are more accountable to the electorate than are appointed judges, such 
judges may pose less of a danger of frustrating the majority by creating a 
tyranny of the minority.148  Even unelected state judges may arguably pose 
145 Evidence of this phenomenon can be seen where Congress has amended statutes in response to 
interpretations with which it did not agree.  E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2(2), 
105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (2000)) (finding that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), was not an accurate interpretation of Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000)).
146 Part of this difficulty lies in the nature of statutory interpretation.  How is it possible to assign a 
single meaning to a complex collection of words put together by a number of different actors, subject to 
differing influences, through an interactive process designed to frustrate the exercise of power?  The 
elusive nature of statutory interpretation and how courts should engage in it has been debated by many. 
See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat:  The Revival of Theory in Statutory  
Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 252–54 (1992) (describing the views of three prominent voices in 
the current statutory-interpretation debate:  Judges Posner and Easterbrook in the Seventh Circuit and 
Justice Scalia).  For more on the debate between Judge Posner, on the one hand, and Judge Easterbrook 
and Justice Scalia on the other, compare United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990) (en 
banc) (Easterbrook, J.), aff’d sub nom. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991), superseded by 
statute,  Mandatory  Minimum Sentencing  Reform Act  of  1994,  Pub.  L.  No.  103-322,  §§ 80001(a), 
280001, 108 Stat. 1985, 1985, 2095 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2000)),  as recognized in United 
States v. Clark, 110 F.3d 15 (6th Cir. 1997),  with id. at 1331–38 (Posner, J., dissenting).  See also 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 275 (1990) (discussing whether an objective method 
of statutory interpretation is possible);  ANTONIN SCALIA,  A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE LAW 23–29  (1997)  (outlining  a  textualist  theory  of  statutory  interpretation);  Frank  H. 
Easterbrook,  Statutes’ Domains, 50  U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 533 (1983) (listing the sources judges draw 
upon when interpreting statutes).   For  an alternate view of statutory interpretation, see  WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE, JR.,  DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 38–47 (1994) (describing and criticizing overreliance 
on text to the exclusion of other interpretive tools).
147 See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF 
POLITICS 113–83 (1962) (arguing that the judicial power could be dangerous, but that the institutional 
limits  the  Court  puts  on  itself  guard  against  the  worst  dangers);  JOHN HART ELY,  DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 4–9 (1980) (describing the underlying theory of the Constitution 
as grounded in the notion of government by the majority); STEPHEN P. POWERS & STANLEY ROTHMAN, THE 
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH?:   CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 177–87  (2002)  (criticizing  recent 
Supreme Court jurisprudence with respect to both constitutional and statutory interpretation); Redish, 
supra note 144, at 707–08 (describing the countermajoritarian difficulty).  But see Cynthia R. Farina, 
Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 
500 (1989) (suggesting that courts might have a role in defining public policy).
148 See Paul  D.  Carrington,  Restoring  Vitality  to  State  and  Local  Politics  by  Correcting  the  
Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L. REV. 397, 414 (1999) (remarking on the use 
of elections in state court regimes to hold judges politically accountable); Helen Hershkoff,  Positive 
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less of a countermajoritarian difficulty for state-law issues than do federal 
judges for state or federal law issues.  State judges may feel closer to their 
communities than do federal judges simply by virtue of the fact that state 
districts are smaller.149  Additionally, as a part of state government, state 
judges may feel more bound to that smaller community of people and may 
be more active in other ways in it.150  As a result, they may be more likely 
to know what the will of the representative branches is and what remedies 
are expected within the State.
This  closeness  is  especially  salient  for  statutory  interpretation;  state 
judges are more likely than their  federal  counterparts  to know what the 
issues of public debate were when state legislation was proposed, what the 
state legislature thought it was doing when it passed the legislation, and 
what the situation in the State was before and after that legislation was 
passed.  That distinction may be less important at the trial level, where even 
federal districts are within a State’s boundaries, but it would apply with 
some force at the appellate level.  Certainly, there is little to suggest that 
the United States Supreme Court is in a better position than any state court 
to  understand  why  the  state  legislature  thought  a  particular  piece  of 
legislation was needed.
State courts also have more flexibility to respond to local concerns than 
do federal courts, because state court decisions are not as far reaching, and, 
as a result, they may be viewed as more democratically legitimate.151  Thus, 
a  state  judicial  branch need not  be  restrained in  the  same way that  the 
federal judicial branch has restrained itself.
Rights and State Constitutions:  The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 
1158–60 (1999) [hereinafter Hershkoff,  Positive Rights]  (discussing how judicial election results  in 
judicial vulnerability, which impacts decision making); Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1887 (noting the 
effect of elected judiciaries (citing HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS:  AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 
OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE 21 (7th ed. 1998))).  Of course, state judges 
may be ill-equipped to prevent tyrannies by the majority, but that is an entirely separate issue being 
debated in states across the country.  See Steven P.  Croley,  The Majoritarian Difficulty:  Elective  
Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 726–28 (1995) (questioning whether elected 
judiciaries  may be unable to protect  minorities and whether they are capable of  impartial  decision 
making); Hershkoff,  supra note 134, at 1887 (noting that critics question whether elected state judges 
can sufficiently protect against the majority (citing DENNIS C. MUELLER, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 288 
(1996)));  Hershkoff,  Positive  Rights,  supra,  at  1160–61  (expressing concern  over  the  threat  to  the 
judiciary’s rights-enforcing role when the judiciary is elected, because the judiciary will simply reflect 
legislative choices).
149 See Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1887 (citing Donald W. Brodie & Hans A. Linde, State Court 
Review of Administrative Action:  Prescribing the Scope of Review, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 537, 542).
150 Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword:  State Courts and the Strategic Space between the Norms and  
Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959, 976 (1985).
151 See Hershkoff,  supra note  134, at 1887, 1902 (commenting on the local, rather than national, 
scope of state court decisions, which allows for more experimentation (quoting Burt Neuborne, Toward 
Procedural  Parity  in  Constitutional  Litigation,  22  WM.  &  MARY L.  REV.  725,  732  (1981)));  Burt 
Neuborne, Foreword, State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 899 
(1989) (discussing the democratic imprimatur of state courts).  This flexibility, however, might limit 
state judges’ use of politically unpopular remedies when those remedies are called for.   Hershkoff, 
supra note  134,  at  1887  n.287  (citing  CHARLES M.  HAAR,  SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE:   RACE,  SPACE,  AND 
AUDACIOUS JUDGES 148–50 (1996)); see also Dan T. Carter, “Let Justice Be Done”:  Public Passion and  
Judicial Courage in Modern Alabama, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 553, 554 (1998) (describing the refusal of the 
Alabama Supreme Court to order new trials in the infamous, racially charged Scottsboro trials of 1931).
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Apart from the concerns about the accountability of institutions, federal 
separation-of-powers theory seeks to take advantage of a different kind of 
institutional competence:  a faith in a functional division of labor.152  The 
federal  elected  branches  are  better  equipped  than  the  federal  courts  to 
create national policy and were designed that way.153  Conversely, federal 
courts are more competent to adjudicate disputes among parties and to say 
what legislation means or how it applies to the world.154  Coupled with this 
separation of functions is the notion that the federal government is one of 
limited  jurisdiction,  and  hence,  the  judicial  power  of  federal  courts  is 
thought to be rather narrow.155
The functions of state courts, on the other hand, are not limited in this 
way.   First,  they  are  courts  of  general  jurisdiction,  and  therefore,  are 
viewed as having broader inherent powers than those of federal courts.156 
For example, state courts have always engaged in common-law creation, 
while federal courts are thought to be able to create common law only in 
limited circumstances.157  Many state constitutions give the state judicial 
152 Rogan Kersh et al.,  “More a Distinction of Words than Things”:  The Evolution of Separated  
Powers in American States, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 5, 12 (1998); see also John Hart Ely, Another  
Such Victory:  Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World Where Courts Are No Different from  
Legislatures, 77  VA. L. REV. 833, 833–35 (1991) (arguing that the judicial branch has characteristics 
that  make  it  an  appropriate  check  on  legislative  power).   But  see Duncan  Kennedy,  Strategizing 
Strategic Behavior in Legal Interpretation, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 785, 785 (suggesting that lawmaking is 
not so easily divided between adjudicative and legislative institutions).
153 See HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR., AMERICA’S CONSTITUTIONAL SOUL 122 (1991) (describing Hamilton’s 
theory that  “separation makes the powers work better” and that “power is not generalized but kept 
distinct  in  sorts  or  classes  and  understood  as  power  to  perform  some  definite  function  (well)”); 
Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1891 (describing the ways in which Congress’s setup enhances its policy-
making ability); Abner J. Mikva, Why Judges Should Not Be Advicegivers:  A Response to Professor  
Neal  Katyal,  50  STAN.  L.  REV. 1825,  1828  (1998)  (arguing  that  both  the  fact  of  election  and the 
procedures that Congress follows make it institutionally better able to craft policy for the nation); David 
L. Schapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519, 551–58 (1988) (comparing the 
institutional advantages of courts and legislatures).
154 See Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1877–79 (defining the power granted by Article III in terms of 
the traditional power of common-law courts to decide cases and controversies);  see also Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (describing the judicial function as one of interpretation); 
Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question:  A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 
518 (1966) (underscoring the court’s role in saying what the law is).
155 See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (comparing the limited jurisdiction of federal 
courts  with  the  general  jurisdiction  of  state  courts),  superseded  by  statute,  Federal  Courts  Study 
Committee Implementation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 104-650, § 310(a), 104 Stat. 5104, 5113; Robert J. 
Pushaw, Jr.,  The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86  IOWA L. REV. 
735, 739, 823–34 (2001) (describing the narrowness of the federal government’s powers as a structural 
constitutional principle).
156 See Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1888–89 (remarking that state courts can often hear claims in 
substantive areas, arising under both the common law and expansive state constitutions, that federal 
courts cannot); Mark H. Zitzewitz, Comment, State v. Krotzer:  Inherent Judicial Authority—Going 
Where No Court  Has  Gone Before,  81  MINN.  L.  REV.  1049,  1060 (1997)  (describing  the  inherent 
authority claimed by state courts).
157 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (determining that there is no general 
federal common law and, rather than discerning principles of such nonexistent general common law, 
federal judges are to apply the law of the State in which they sit); see also Martha A. Field, Sources of 
Law:  The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 885 (1986) (discussing the scope of 
power of federal courts to create federal common law); Michael Herz,  Choosing Between Normative 
and Descriptive Versions of the Judicial Role, 75  MARQ. L. REV. 725, 733 (1992) (noting the policy-
making aspect of creating common law); Harry H. Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE 
L.J. 486, 486 (1982) (describing the perception that the scope of judicial review should be limited).
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branch  a  broad  responsibility  to  help  make  state  policy  or  exercise 
administrative  power,  either  explicitly  or  through  provisions  that  grant 
positive  rights  to  individuals.158  Additionally,  state  legislative  and 
executive branches are not necessarily organized the same way, or with the 
same  power,  as  their  federal  counterparts,  which  lessens  their  special 
expertise  or  democratic  responsiveness.159  Finally,  many  States  have 
mechanisms for direct, rather than representative democracy,160 which some 
commentators suggest necessitates greater state-court vigilance to protect 
against tyrannies of the majority made possible by a less deliberative form 
of lawmaking.161  Based on the different institutional competencies of state 
courts and state representative branches, there is little reason to assume that 
state separation of powers must play out the same way as in the federal 
system.162
Because  the  issue  of  state  separation  of  powers  is  fundamentally  a 
matter of state constitutional law, federal courts should leave that balance 
to the States as a unitary entity.  Where the state court interpreted a state 
statute, its very exercise of interpretation struck a particular balance.  Even 
if the state court exceeded its powers under the state constitution, the issue 
is  one that  should be  left  to  the  States  to  resolve.   In  fact,  because of 
interbranch cooperation in state systems, it may be significantly easier for 
state legislatures to correct erroneous state court decisions than it  is  for 
Congress to correct erroneous federal rulings.163  Federal courts,  even if 
158 See Hershkoff,  supra note  134, at 1863–75, 1880–82, 1889–94 (describing the various ways in 
which state courts exercise power that Article III courts lack and the ways in which state constitutional 
provisions might differ from federal provisions).
159 See Hershkoff,  supra note  134,  at  1895–98  (emphasizing  that  Article  III’s  preference  for 
legislative lawmaking on the federal level is not similarly expressed in state constitutions or divisions of 
power); Rossi,  supra note 142, at 1359–62, 1375–80 (discussing the strong nondelegation principle in 
state constitutional law and other differences in organization of State powers).
160 See 33 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 233 tbl.5.14 (2000).
161 See Robin Charlow,  Judicial  Review,  Equal  Protection and the  Problem with Plebiscites,  79 
CORNELL L.  REV. 527,  529 (1994);  John F.  Cooper,  The Citizen Initiative Petition to  Amend State 
Constitutions:   A  Concept  Whose  Time  Has  Passed,  or  a  Vigorous  Component  of  Participatory 
Democracy  at  the  State  Level?,  28  N.M.  L.  REV. 227,  258–59  (1998);  Philip  P.  Frickey,  The 
Communion of Strangers:  Representative Government, Direct Democracy, and the Privatization of the  
Public Sphere, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 421, 435 (1998); David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide?  An 
Assessment of Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 40–42 (1995); cf. Clayton P. 
Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local Government Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 
930, 974–84 (1988) (considering the problem of interest-group capture of plebiscites).
162 See Mark Tushnet,  The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108  YALE L.J. 1225, 
1307 (1999) (discussing the different effects that result when an institution or practice is appropriated 
from one government to another).  Despite this fact, some commentators suggest that the States ought to 
mimic the federal system.  See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Interbranch Accountability in State Government 
and the Constitutional Requirement of Judicial Independence, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21, 23 (1998) 
(proposing that state and federal courts adopt the same approach to the constitutional requirement of 
judicial independence); Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., Toward a New Partnership:  The Future Relationship of  
Federal and State Constitutional Law, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 729, 736 (1988) (“We simply cannot reason or 
argue about what state constitutional law should be without resort to principles of federal constitutional 
law . . . .”).
163 The combination of lawmaking by referendum; the smaller, more localized lawmaking body; and 
the use of advisory opinions all work to limit the power of the state courts to frustrate the will of the 
people.  See Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 148, at 1162–66.  Many states also allow for much 
easier amendment of their state constitutions, providing a more significant check on the state courts’ 
powers to interpret their own constitution.  Id. at 1164.  My own State of Alabama reflects an extreme 
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they  have  to  power  to  do  so,  should  not  intervene.   Therefore,  federal 
courts  should defer  to the balance struck by state courts  and accept  the 
interpretation  offered  by  the  state  court  in  an  exercise  of  that  balance, 
unless there is an important federal interest that would conflict with that 
deference.164
IV.  TO DEFER OR NOT
We could adopt a number of different approaches to federalism, or get 
rid  of  it  entirely  in  favor  of  a  unitary  system.   Instead,  for  structural, 
functional,  qualitative,  economic,  or  philosophical  reasons,165 we,  as  a 
country, have retained not only a federal structure but a system of judicial 
federalism  in  which  much  of  the  development  of  law,  both  state  and 
federal, is done by state courts.166  And if we have held on to this federal 
arrangement for the value of diversity and experimentation or to promote 
individual liberty or community, we should erode it only after deliberation 
and consideration of the effects of such erosion.
Fundamental  to  maintaining  states  as  separate  from  the  federal 
government  is  the  ability  of  the  State  to  define  itself  through  its  own 
constitution.  And given the starting point of analysis in this Article, that 
the primacy of a branch of government is a matter of state constitutional 
law, our inquiry necessarily must turn to explore what interest might be 
sufficient to warrant not deferring to the state judicial branch once it has 
struck a  balance of  state  powers  and interpreted state  law.  In  order  to 
prevent inadvertent erosion of federalism, that reason would have to be a 
relatively strong one that promotes some substantive federal interest, apart 
from uniformity for the sake of uniformity.
The most compelling reason not to defer would be a circumstance in 
which the federal court has a reason to suspect the state court of working to 
frustrate a federal right or a federal interest.167  For example, where the state 
court deviated from prior state law in a way that violated due process, as 
the Supreme Court  found had happened in  NAACP v.  Alabama ex rel. 
in this regard, with 777 amendments as of the date this Article went to press.  See ALA. CONST.
164 Cf. Romer  v.  Evans,  517 U.S.  620,  626 (1996)  (deferring to  the  Colorado Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the purpose of a constitutional amendment); Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 
543–45 (1982) (treating the purpose of a proposition to amend the California Constitution as an issue of 
fact,  although that  court  agreed that  the purpose stated in  the proposition was  the actual  purpose); 
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373–74 (1967) (deferring to the state court’s interpretation of a state 
constitutional provision).
165 These  terms  are  described  by  Michael  Solimine  and  James  Walker  as  some  broad  labels 
applicable to some of the schools of thought about federalism.  SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 18, at 8–
9.
166 See id. at  33  (describing the  Hart  and Wechsler  paradigm in which  state  courts  have  some 
responsibility for defining and enforcing federal law).
167 See PETER W.  LOW &  JOHN C.  JEFFRIES,  JR.,  FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE 
RELATIONS 83 (5th ed. 2004) (describing the possible problem of unlimited state authority to define 
contracts undermining the Contracts Clause of the Constitution); Fitzgerald,  supra note 51, at 158–71 
(discussing the theories of federal supremacy and due process that are used to justify federal policing of 
state court decisions).
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Patterson168 and Bouie v. City of Columbia,169 the federal court would have 
a constitutional duty to intervene.  In this way, state courts might interpret 
state law in a way that frustrates review by federal  courts  and hampers 
enforcement  of  important  federal  rights.170  Conversely,  the  most 
compelling reason to defer would be where the state-law issue was truly 
discrete from any federal issue, such that no federal interest could be said 
to be at stake.
Short  of  these  situations,  deciding  whether  to  defer  is  much  more 
difficult.  The vast majority of State action is reviewed under a standard 
that is designed to be quite deferential:  rational-basis review.171  In fact, 
rational-basis  review  is  so  deferential  that  some  commentators  have 
suggested that it  is not review but is instead the absence of review, the 
refusal  to  commit  judicial  resources  to  subjects  outside  of  core 
constitutional  concerns.172  Rational-basis  review  does  not  enforce  any 
substantive right or enumerated power.173  Rather, it is a way to limit the 
countermajoritarian  power  of  Article  III  judges.174  Thus,  rational-basis 
review embodies a policy of deference to the federal legislative branch as 
well as to the States.  However, the rational-basis test does not enforce any 
positive constitutional delegation of power to the state legislative branch 
that would justify not treating the States as unitary entities.
And so, on the one hand, it is easy to see why, as a function of accepted 
notions  of  federal  institutional  competence,  federal  courts,  in  exercising 
rational-basis  review,  reflexively  defer  to  the  legislative  branch,  any 
legislative branch, at the expense of any gloss a court has put on the law. 
But as explained above, assessing institutional competence at the state level 
is not for federal courts to address in most instances.175  The question of 
institutional competence is a matter of state constitutional law in the first 
instance,  making it  a  question more properly dealt  with by state  courts 
168 357 U.S. 449, 457 (1958).
169 378 U.S. 347, 350 (1964).
170 See Fitzgerald,  supra note  51, at 87–90 (arguing that the Supreme Court should defer to state-
court judgments, unless the Court explains why it has reason to suspect the States of frustrating the 
operation of federal law).
171 See Stephen Loffredo,  Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141  U. PA. L. REV. 1277, 
1282–84  (1993)  (critiquing  the  application  of  rational-basis  review  to  laws  burdening  the  poor); 
Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes:  Reflecting on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 NW. 
U. L. REV. 410, 410–11 (1993) (noting that constitutional jurisprudence identifies very few classes for 
heightened review).
172 Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 148, at 1153; see also Loffredo, supra note 171, at 1282–
84 (explaining the very deferential review of laws burdening the poor); Sager,  supra note 171, at 410 
(discussing the Court’s minimum protection of economic rights).
173 See Erwin  Chemerinsky,  The  Supreme  Court,  1988  Term—Foreword:   The  Vanishing 
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 49 (1989).
174 See MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS:  LAW OR POLITICS? 84–95 (1994) (describing 
judicial minimalism); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty:  The Road to  
Judicial Supremacy (pt. 1), 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 335 (1998) (discussing the ongoing debate over the 
ability of an unelected branch to overturn popular decisions); James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope 
of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, Address at the Congress on Jurisprudence and Law 
Reform  (Aug.  9,  1893),  in 7  HARV.  L.  REV. 129,  144  (1893)  (noting  the  different  obligations  of 
legislators and judges in interpreting the Constitution).
175 For examples of when the institutional competence of state courts may need to be examined in 
order to protect individual rights, see Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 148, at 1159–60.
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under the Supreme Court’s notions of dual federalism.176  Thus, without 
some substantive federal interest to enforce, federal courts have no good 
reason not to defer to state court interpretations of state law.
One  could  argue  that  the  federal  interest  at  stake  is  uniformity;  the 
rational-basis  test  must  mean  the  same  thing  everywhere  that  it  is 
applied.177  Uniformity is an important federal interest, but only when it 
serves  to  protect  federal  sovereignty  and  supremacy.   If  the  federal 
government  has  no  sovereignty  interest,  then  it  has  no  interest  in 
uniformity.  To say otherwise would take us to the world envisioned by the 
Supreme Court in  Swift v. Tyson,178 where the development of common 
law by federal courts spread uniform common law throughout the country 
for the sake of uniformity alone.  Going there is certainly a choice we could 
make  as  a  society,  but  we  have  not  made  it,  and  the  Supreme  Court 
specifically rejected it in Erie.179  Without a substantive federal interest to 
be  enforced  by  the  rational-basis  test,  it  is  difficult  to  see  why federal 
courts should exercise independent judgment on an issue of state law any 
time a state court has spoken.
At the opposite end of the review spectrum, where a fundamental right 
is  at  stake,  or  a  suspect  class  affected,  the  federal  constitutional  test  to 
apply would be strict scrutiny.  Strict scrutiny, unlike rational-basis review, 
is employed to enforce substantive federal constitutional values of equality 
and liberty.  The Fourteenth Amendment represents a fundamental shift of 
power  away  from  the  States  and  to  the  federal  government  to  protect 
individual rights.180  Individual rights to liberty and equality are at stake 
even where strict scrutiny is not employed, and the Fourteenth Amendment 
places vindication of those rights primarily in the federal government.181 
So  perhaps  the  proper  touchstone  here  is  simply  whether  a  liberty  or 
equality issue is at stake.  If so, federal courts have an interest that warrants 
exercising independent review, not deferring to at least some state court 
interpretations.
Certainly, however, there are reasons to defer even here.  For example, 
allowing  States  to  interpret  their  laws  narrowly  so  as  to  avoid  federal 
constitutional  questions  strengthens  the  quality  of  state  government  by 
allowing the state judicial branch to participate in enforcing the Federal 
Constitution.   It  also  limits  the  extension  of  constitutional  principles 
without a solid foundation.  So, federal courts, it would seem, have stronger 
reasons both to defer and not to defer in the strict-scrutiny context.
176 See Schapiro, supra note 15, at 1409 (noting that, under Erie, interpretation of state constitutions 
rests with with the high court of each State).
177 But see Michael E. Solimine,  The Future of Parity,  46  WM.  & MARY L. REV. 1457, 1483–86 
(2005) (noting an inevitable lack of uniformity in the application of even ostensibly uniform federal 
tests).
178 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled, Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
179 Erie, 304 U.S. at 79–80.
180 See Aynes,  supra note  133, at 66–74 (describing early theories of incorporation of the Bill of 
Rights against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment); see also McCormick, supra note 66, at 
370 (noting that Congress enacted the Fourteenth Amendment because States could not be trusted to 
sufficiently protect equality and liberty).
181 See McCormick,  supra note  66, at 370–71 (suggesting that this arrangement maximizes liberty 
and equality for all citizens).
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In  either  context,  where  the  state  court  is  overprotecting  a  federal 
interest  or  underprotecting  a  state  interest,  it  is  difficult  to  see  what 
federalism  value  is  promoted  by  failing  to  defer  to  the  state-court 
interpretation of state law.182  One argument for not deferring to state-court 
interpretations  could  be  that,  if  States  wish  to  deviate  from the  federal 
model, they should do so by grounding decisions in their own constitutions, 
rather than by relying on federal constitutional principles.  In other words, 
let  the  States  be  politically  accountable  for  their  decisions  rather  than 
suggesting that the federal government is responsible.183
By not allowing state courts to shift responsibility, federal courts may 
enhance political responsibility in a more positive way as well.  States and 
localities are given the chance to use the state political process to remedy 
constitutional violations, which may give those remedies greater credibility 
with the people of the State, which, in turn, should make those remedies 
more effective.184  The effectiveness of the remedy is enhanced not only by 
the chance for democratic resolution, but also by the fact that it is chosen 
by insiders rather than being imposed from outside.185  Experimentation by 
state  legislatures  may lead  to  a  greater  ability  by  the  states  to  develop 
innovative  ways  to  remedy  constitutional  problems.186  That  innovation 
benefits us all.187  This state innovation, however, might be achieved by 
ensuring a  strong role  for  the  state  judiciary,  regardless  of  whether  the 
constitutional limit state courts rely on is a federal or state one.
This inquiry has implications far beyond the meaning or purpose state 
courts  find,  as  well.   State  courts’  processes  necessarily  impact  the 
deference equation.  For example, for a brief period of time the Connecticut 
Supreme Court adopted a method of statutory interpretation different from 
the method used in federal courts.188  That court held that it could use any 
182 See Lawrence Gene Sager,  Fair Measure:  The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional  
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1249 (1978) (“Unless competing constitutional concerns are at stake, 
there would seem to be no occasion for an abiding federal judicial role in policing state courts against 
overly generous interpretations of federal constitutional values.”).  Justice Stevens has repeatedly raised 
this issue in dissents to cases that reverse an overprotection of federal rights.  Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. 
Ct. 2516, 2540–41 (2006) (Stevens., J., dissenting); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 695 (1986) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1067–70 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183 This seems to be the gist of Scalia’s concurrence in  Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at 2530–31 
(Scalia,  J.,  concurring),  in  which  he  discusses  the  difficulty  of  Kansas  voters  remedying the  state 
supreme court’s  error.   So Scalia, it  seems, would argue that this  accountability is essential to the 
political process because voters must know how to change the law that a state court is applying if they 
do not agree with a result.
184 See Hershkoff,  supra note  134, at 1900–01 (noting the Court’s approach of giving States the 
opportunity to address their equal protection and due process violations).
185 Id. at 1902.
186 In his dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, Justice Brandeis expressed this point in a now-
famous line:  “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, 
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk 
to the rest of the country.”  285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
187 See id.; see also Lawrence G. Sager, Cool Federalism and the Life-Cycle of Moral Progress, 46 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1385, 1387–88 (2005) (demonstrating that liberal moral progress, such as the 
right to gay marriage or the right of the terminally ill to die with dignity, comes about through a process 
of invention by a single State, propogation to other States, and then consolidation within the federal 
system).
188 See State v. Courchesne, 816 A.2d 562, 582 (Conn. 2003) (explicitly rejecting the plain-meaning 
rule used by the Unied States Supreme Court in statutory interpretation), superseded by statute, Act of 
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contextual information to interpret the text of a statute, even if that text was 
not  ambiguous.   That  approach  is  contrary  to  what  is  called the  “plain 
meaning rule,” which is used by federal courts and which allows a court to 
consult  extratextual  materials  only  when  statutory  language  is 
ambiguous.189  The method of statutory interpretation should be a matter 
negotiated between the States’ legislative and judicial branches, and not 
necessarily imposed from outside, unless that method is somehow used to 
frustrate a substantive federal interest.  Similarly, State choices regarding 
the amount of deference reviewing state courts give to lower state tribunals 
may differ from the level of deference given by their federal counterparts. 
It is difficult to see how that decision implicates any substantive federal 
interest  that  would  warrant  imposing  the  federal  model  on  the  States. 
Ultimately, a lack of deference could impact the States’ abilities to interpret 
the  substantive  provisions  of  their  own  constitutions  where  those 
constitutions mirror the language of the Federal Constitution, or perhaps 
even where similar rights are only mentioned.  Even for those who argue 
against a  dual-federalism model,  this  result  would encroach too far  into 
State autonomy and sovereignty.
V.  CONCLUSION
Federal courts encounter state-law issues in a great variety of situations, 
with varying levels of state-court interpretation attached.  To date, federal 
courts have treated state courts sometimes as if  they were lower federal 
courts  and sometimes as if  they were  the  courts  of  completely separate 
sovereigns, without explaining why.  While this lack of transparency gives 
federal courts the greatest amount of discretion and power, it does little to 
support  the  legitimacy of federal  courts.   This  Article  has  attempted to 
describe when the Supreme Court will defer and when it will not, and has 
found that difference somewhat counterintuitive and in conflict  with the 
Supreme  Court’s  notions  of  dual  sovereignty.   While  dual  sovereignty 
might be neither truly possible nor desirable in the age of the administrative 
state, it can provide some practical boundaries to divide the labor of the 
courts  in  our  federal  system when they necessarily  interact.   Thus,  this 
Article has suggested that federal courts defer to state courts unless an issue 
presents  a  substantive  federal  interest  that  warrants  independent  federal 
review.  I hope that this provides some normative guidance that the courts 
could consider in negotiating those interactions.
June 26, 2003, 2003 Conn. Pub. Acts 154 (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-2z (West 2005)).  The 
Connecticut  legislature  enacted  a  statute  to  overrule  that  part  of  Courchesne,  and the  Connecticut 
Supreme Court acquiesced without analyzing whether the legislative overruling was valid under the 
state constitution.  Goodyear v. Discala, 849 A.2d 791, 796 n.4 (Conn. 2004) (citing Paul Dinto Elec. 
Contractors,  Inc. v.  City of Waterbury, 835 A.2d 33, 39 n.10 (Conn. 2003)).   Despite the fact that 
Connecticut no longer deviates from the federal method, the example remains a useful illustration of the 
possibility that a State could makes this change.
189 See Courchesne, 816 A.2d at 578–86 (explaining reasons for rejecting the plain-meaning rule and 
adopting instead a broader inquiry into the meaning of the statutory language in all cases).
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